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TOWARD PROCEDURAL PARITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION
BURT NEUBORNE*
THE ROLE OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION
The debate over the relative efficacy of state and federal courts
as constitutional enforcement forums may have reached an im-
passe.1 Despite encouraging signs of vigor at the state level,2 many
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1. See generally Fischer, Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on Judicial Activ-
ism in the Realm of Forum Allocation Between State and Federal Courts, 34 U. MIAw L.
REV. 175 (1980); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HRv. L. REv. 1105 (1977). Professor
Fischer argues that Congress is the appropriate forum to determine the allocation of busi-
ness between state and federal courts. One can hardly quarrel with his abstract proposition.
Unfortunately, Congress rarely manifests its intention clearly, forcing courts to "discover"
legislative intent. It is somewhat artificial to pretend, as does Professor Fischer, that judicial
perception of relative institutional competence will not play a large role in the search for an
often fictive legislative intent.
2. An unscientific sampling of recent state cases exhibiting serious concern for constitu-
tional values includes: Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alas. 1979) (right to appointed counsel
in certain custody proceedings); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29
Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center,
23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979) (leafleting in shopping centers pro-
tected by California constitution), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980); Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d
22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979) (right to appointed counsel in paternity suit);
Tracy v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal. 3d 760, 587 P.2d 227, 150 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1978) (misde-
meanants facing $100 fine entitled to appointed counsel); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,
583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978) (invalidation of racially discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971)
(equalization of school financing); Coxon v. State, 365 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(indigent's probation cannot be revoked because unable to pay fine); State v. Brown, 371 So.
2d 751 (La. 1979) (invalidation of racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges); Dis-
trict Attorney v. Watson, - Mass. ., 411 N.E.2d 1274 (1980) (invalidation of capital punsh-
ment under state constitution); Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242, 339 N.E.2d 676
(1975) (invalidation of death penalty for rape); People v. Johnson, - Mich. , 283 N.W.2d
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civil rights-civil liberties lawyers remain persudded that federal
courts, especially federal trial courts, continue to provide a "bet-
ter" forum for the enunciation and enforcement of constitutional
values.3 It may prove impossible, however, to develop empirical
support for what is, after all, a subjective impression, albeit a
widely shared one. Given the value judgments which inevitably af-
fect one's measurement of the quality and correctness of constitu-
tional jurisprudence, objective techniques such as statistical analy-
sis seem woefully inadequate m attempting to determine the
"better" forum. Qualitative analysis, with its subjective pitfalls, is
probably our only valid comparative tool.4
632 (1979) (right to appointed counsel in grand jury contempt proceedings); Hepfel v.
Bashaw, - Minn. ., 279 N.W.2d 342 (1979) (right to appointed counsel m paternity suit);
Lee v. Lawson, 375 So. 2d 1019 (Miss. 1979) (system based solely upon money bail would
violate equal protection clause); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (prohibition of exclusionary zoning), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (equali-
zation of school financing), cert. dented, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); People ex rel. Menechmo v.
Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971) (right to appointed coun-
sel at probation revocation hearing); People v. McCray, 104 Misc. 2d 782, 429 N.Y.S.2d 158
(Sup. Ct. 1980) (validation of racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges); Oregon
v. Hass, 267 Or. 489, 517 P.2d 671 (1973) (criminal defendant's statements after refusal of
request to talk to attorney madmssible for impeachment purposes), rev'd, 420 U.S. 714
(1974); and State v. Ashbaugh, 90 Wash. 2d 432, 583 P.2d 1206 (1978) (criminal defendant
cannot lose appeal rights because unable to pay filing fee).
Law review comment on the increasing significance of state courts as forums for constitu-
tional enforcement include: Black, Obscenity and Freedom of Expression in Michigan, 56
U. DET. J. URB. L. 27 (1978); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARV. L. Rxv. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights
in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. Rav. 873 (1976); and Vitiello, Independent and
Adequate State Grounds: A Stone Unturned by Louisiana's Criminal Defense Bar?, 25
Loy. L. Rav. 745 (1979).
3. I have attempted to explain my institutional preference for federal trial courts as con-
stitutional enforcement mechanisms in Neuborne, supra note 1. For an analysis of choice of
forum in diversity litigation see Summers, Analysts of Factors That Influence Choice of
Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IowA L. Rzv. 933 (1962), and Hill, Substance and Procedure
in State F.E.L.A. Actions-The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHIo ST. L.J. 384 (1956).
4. It is helpful in comparing state and federal courts to note the relatively rare situations
in which a jurisdiction's state and federal courts are simultaneously confronted with the
identical constitutional issue. Compare Long Island Lighting Co. v. New York State Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, No. 77-972 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part mem.,
(E.D.N.Y. July 18, 1980), with Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 93 Misc. 2d
313, 402 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 63 A.D.2d 364, 407 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1978), aff'd, 47
N.Y.2d 94, 390 N.E.2d 749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980), and Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 63 A.D.2d 364, 407 N.Y.S.2d 735
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Comparative qualitative analysis, of course, presupposes the ex-
istence of a consensus as to what we mean by "better." My defini-
tion, which I hope is widely shared, views the better forum as the
one more likely to assign a very high value to the protection of the
individual, even the unreasonable or dangerous individual, against
the collective, so that the definition of the individual right in ques-
tion will receive its most expansive reading and its most energetic
enforcement. Such a definition of "better" is based on an assump-
tion that it is socially desirable to route controversies involving as-
serted constitutional rights of individuals to those judicial forums
most likely to resolve them in favor of the individual. Since I be-
lieve that the preeminent political challenge posed by what is left
of the twentieth century-at least in the industrialized west-is
the preservation of the individual as a force capable of effectively
checking the collective, it follows that routing constitutional cases
to the judicial forum most sympathetic to the individual is
desirable.
If, however, one were to reject the notion that the individual is
an endangered species in need of all the shoring up he can get, in
favor of a view that there already is too much individual self-indul-
gence in our society, the better forum may become the forum less
likely to favor the individual at the expense of a democratic con-
sensus.5 I suspect that much of the disagreement over forum allo-
cation in constitutional cases turns, first, on an unarticulated disa-
greement of policy over which meaning "better" should have and,
second, on an often unarticulated disagreement of fact over which
forum more closely approximates a given definition of "better."
In seeking to define the meaning of "better," I have made what
to some will appear an arbitrary distinction between constitutional
issues involving individual rights and constitutional issues involv-
ing the allocation of power between branches and components of
the government. I have ignored the allocation of power issues and
concentrated on the individual rights issues. Why, one may ask, is
one species of constitutional issue more important than the other
(1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 94, 390 N.E.2d 749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2343
(1980).
5. Cf. Rehnqust, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 T x. L. Rxv. 693 (1976) (judi-
cially imposed rules of conduct erode democratic values).
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in assessing the relative merits of potential constitutional enforce-
ment forums? The answer lies in a distinction between two broad
categories of constitutional values-"means values," which define
the proper mechanism of government, and "ends values," which
express the purposes of government. I believe that ends values are
more important than means values and would argue that a decision
solicitous of first amendment values is worth more than an equally
well reasoned decision protective of the eleventh amendment.
Of course, one cannot ignore the "means" strictures of the Con-
stitution. To do so would not only weaken the constitutional fabric
generally, but would directly jeopardize ends values which can best
be realized in a setting which respects the separation of powers
and the exigencies of federalism. If, however, one as-
sumes-rightly, I think-that state and federal courts will each
grapple in good faith with both means and ends cases, it is reason-
able to be more concerned with a relative propensity to decide
ends values cases in a given way, without regard to the relative
propensity of each system to decide means values cases.
I know of no more acceptable way to resolve the policy dispute
over the best meaning of "better" than by reference to a
majoritarian consensus, expressed legislatively by the enactment of
the precursor to 42 U.S.C. § 19836 and judicially by the liberal con-
struction afforded section 1983 by the modern Supreme Court,7
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which contained the original version
of § 1983, has been exhaustively discussed by the Supreme Court. E.g., Maine v. Thiboutot,
100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980); Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980); Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979); Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
7. The modern history of § 1983 in the Supreme Court begins with Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), which freed § 1983 from a century of conceptual restraints which had im-
posed a de facto requirement of exhaustion of state judicial remedies on many attempts to
enforce constitutional rights in federal court. For a discussion of the evolution of the nonex-
haustion model and its current application, see 1 N. DORSEN, P BE DER & B. NUBORNE,
EMERSON, HAER & DORsEN'S POLITICAL AND CiIL RIGHTS IN THE UNrrE STATES 1535-53
(4th ed. 1976); Neuborne, The Procedural Assault on the Warren Legacy, 5 HOFSTRA L.
I [Vol. 22:725
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that constitutional cases should be routed to the forum most likely
to rule in favor of the individual. Although such a consensus, if it
exists, fixes the meaning of "better," it does not tell us, in fact,
which forum is more likely to rule in favor of the individual. More-
over, even if empirical data existed which would enable us to de-
termine which forum, state or federal, were generally better at de-
ciding constitutional cases, permutations of space, time, and
subject matter would almost certainly dictate substantial devia-
tions from the general norm.8 Accordingly, it is probably impossi-
ble to establish definitively which, if either, judicial system is uni-
formly better at deciding constitutional cases. In the absence of
such a definitive resolution, a choice among three forum-allocation
approaches must be made.
First, we might simply assume that neither forum is better and,
having assumed substantive parity between state and federal
courts, route cases into one forum or another on the basis of "neu-
tral" factors having nothing to do with potential impact on the
merits. Given the legitimate claims of federalism, such an assump-
tion of substantive parity would incline many constitutional cases
involving state and local officials toward state court, at least in the
first instance. Of the various forum-allocation approaches, an as-
sumption of substantive parity is the most beguiling because it
permits us to engage in wishful thinking. However, lawyers
know-at least they think they know-that choice of forum often
affects outcome in constitutional cases. That is why they spend so
much time fighting about it. And, after a tentative gesture in the
direction of an assumption of parity,9 the Supreme Court appears
to have drawn back, recognizing that choice of forum in constitu-
tional cases is, if not outcome-determinative, at least outcome-
relevant. 10
REv. 545, 556-60 (1977).
8. See notes 15-17 & accompanying text tnfra.
9. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976).
10. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In
Rose, the Court declined to apply Stone v. Powell to a claim of discrimination in the selec-
tion of the grand jury that indicts the habeas petitioner, reasoning, "A federal forum must
be available if a full and fair hearing of such claims is to be had." 443 U.S. at 561. Similarly,
in Jackson, the Court authorized a federal habeas corpus court to ascertain whether a "ra-
tional trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt," noting that a state jury or a trial judge "may occasionally convict" lacking such
19811 729
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Second, we might make an arbitrary judgment on the best avail-
able data as to which forum is better and route all constitutional
cases to it as a matter of exclusive jurisdiction. While no significant
support for a regime of exclusive constitutional jurisdiction, either
state or federal, exists, a category of de facto exclusive state juris-
diction is created whenever preclusion is added to an exhaustion
requirement.11 One can hardly imagine a less appropriate mecha-
nism for deciding whether exclusive constitutional jurisdiction
should exist.
Finally, we might recognize that choice of forum in constitu-
tional cases is often relevant to the outcome, but also recognize
that we cannot know in advance which forum will be better in
every case. Accordingly, we might delegate the forum allocation de-
cision, on an ad hoc basis, to the person most likely to possess the
data and motivation necessary to make a sophisticated guess,
plaintiff's counsel. Such a model, essentially one of concurrent ju-
risdiction, permits plaintiffs a relatively free choice of forum in the
expectation that enlightened self-interest will guide constitutional
cases into the forum most likely to enunciate an expansive vision
of the rights of the individual. Despite conceded federalism and
efficiency costs, we have operated under such a system of concur-
rent constitutional jurisdiction since 1961,12 and, although mem-
bers of the Supreme Court have occasionally waflied,15 we seem
firmly committed to it for the foreseeable future.1"
evidence. 443 U.S. at 317.
11. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court linked preclusion with exhaustion
to create a judge-made exclusive state jurisdiction over fourth amendment clains arising in
the context of state criminal proceedings. A similar danger of judge-made exclusive jurisdic-
tion occurs in Pullman abstention settings when a plaintiff fails to file an "England reserva-
tion" in state court. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411
(1964). The Pullman abstention doctrine is discussed in Field, Abstention Doctrine Today,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1977). Finally, if preclusion is added to Younger abstention, that is,
the prohibition of federal intervention with pending state criminal proceedings, Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), a substantial danger exists of judge-made exclusive jurisdiction
over many constitutional controversies. But see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)
(allowing relitigation of prospective claim despite adverse determination n prior state cruni-
nal proceeding). See generally Neuborne, supra note 7, at 560-68; see also Ellis v. Dyson,
421 U.S. 426 (1975).
12. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
13. E.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971) (Burger, C.J., & Blackmun,
J., dissenting); id. at 443 (Black & Blackinun, JJ., dissenting).
14. The current Supreme Court's fidelity to a concurrent jurisdiction model is illustrated
[Vol. 22:725
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As I have suggested, the principal argument in favor of a regime
of concurrent jurisdiction is its capacity to act as a self-correcting
constitutional compass, guiding litigation into the forum most
likely to enunciate an expansive definition of the rights of the indi-
vidual. Today, for many civil rights-civil liberties lawyers, that still
means federal courts. However, choice of forum in constitutional
cases is not writ in stone. Numerous settings exist where a contem-
porary lawyer might opt, on substantive grounds, to litigate a con-
stitutional case in state rather than federal court. A state court
may have already ruled in favor of the right in question on either
state or federal constitutional grounds.15 An institutional prefer-
ence for state over federal courts may exist in a given geographical
area;"" or, in those situations where the Supreme Court appears
hostile to a given position, state courts may be the only game in
town, regardless of general institutional preference.1 7 Moreover, if
we are lucky, the healthy movement toward serious constitutional
jurisprudence in the state courts will continue to the point where
civil rights-civil liberties lawyers in large numbers will be tempted
to resort to them. Such a process, should it occur, would not only
be a welcome application of the principle of concurrent jurisdiction
as a self-correcting constitutional compass but would also promise
several important collateral benefits.
As a matter of resource allocation, it would be desirable to elimi-
nate the need to expend resources of both bench and bar on the
elegant procedural jurisprudence associated with sumg state and
by Board of Regents v. Tomamo, 446 U.S. 478 (1980), in which the Court rejected an at-
tempt by the Second Circuit to encourage litigants to exhaust state judicial remedies prior
to filing a § 1983 action by refusing to toll the § 1983 limitations period during the pendency
of state proceedings. Id. at 492.
15. E.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d
779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592
P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980); Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
16. The institutional preference may be purely local, reflecting the decisional patterns of
a single set of state and federal judges, or broader, reflecting the decisional pattern of a state
or even a circuit. Moreover, such a preference may exist only for certain issues.
17. One would think twice about litigating a shopping center free speech case in a federal
court after Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (rejecting application of first amend-
ment protections to shopping centers).
1981] 731
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local defendants in federal court.18 Of course, if the federal forum
is significantly more likely to provide an expansive definition of the
rights of the individual, the time is well spent. If, however, state
courts appear to offer rough substantive parity, many lawyers
would gladly opt for them and put the time which would have been
spent seeking to decipher Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts
and the Federal System'9 to more productive, although not more
enjoyable, use.
Moreover, apart from the pragmatic question of optimum use of
the time of the bench and bar, effective enforcement of constitu-
tional values by state courts might afford a more harmonious and
effective method of checking local majorities. Whatever the valid-
ity of the concern, federal judges have occasionally been pictured
as "outsiders," rendering their controversial decisions subject to
more resistance than an equally controversial opinion handed
down by the "local" judge.20 To the extent the "local" judge can be
relied upon to check a local majority, some friction may be avoided
and the potentially unpopular decision may be received with better
grace. Finally, once judicial intervention is deemed appropriate, an
energetic state bench has at its disposal a more flexible remedial
armory than does a federal judge, doubly constrained by the article
HI case or controversy requirements and federalism concerns.21
18. While I know no systematic study m the area, I estimate that more than 25% of my
litigation time has been devoted to arguing federalism issues.
19. P BATOR, P MisHKiN, D. SHAPimo & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
20. The "outsider" argument is overstated because it ignores the very substantial roots
which federal trial judges have in the communities they serve. Neuborne, supra note 1, at
1120. Moreover, the very links between a local judge and his constituents render it less
likely that a local jutdge will articulate and enforce countermajoritarian norms in a sustained
manner.
21. Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (eleventh amendment forbids fed-
eral retrospective awards against state), with Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980)
(affirming state award of retrospective § 1983 relief). See also Monell v. Department of So-
cial Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (respondeat superior liability unavailable in § 1983 cases);
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (article III standing doctrine
restricts access to federal courts); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (article III and feder-
alism concerns restrict scope of remedial decree); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (arti-
cle III standing doctrine restricts access to federal courts); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488
(1974) (federalism concerns restrict scope of equity decree).
732 [Vol. 22:725
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THE IMPACT OF PROCEDURAL DISCREPANCiES ON THE CONCURRENT
JURISDICTION MODEL
Thus, under a system of concurrent jurisdiction over constitu-
tional controversies, were the needle of the forum-allocation com-
pass to rncline more toward state courts, it would be an occasion
for genuine satisfaction.2 2 The needle, however, is currently
jammed in the "federal" position. For even when conditions of
rough substantive parity might exist, the comparative procedural
drawbacks of litigating a constitutional claim in many state courts
are often so dramatic that only a clear showing of state substantive
superiority can overcome them. In precisely those situations
where rough substantive parity may be emerging, lawyers are dis-
suaded from testing the waters in state court by three procedural
concerns.
The Uniformity Principle
Whatever else one may say about federal procedure, it is uni-
form. Once the basics are mastered, the same rules apply in Ore-
gon as in Mississippi. Moreover, because they are uniform, federal
procedural rules are shaped and applied by a single body of prece-
dent using a single set of concepts. The existence of a fair degree of
nationwide procedural uniformity, whatever its content, acts as a
powerful magnet drawing constitutional litigation into the federal
courts. The economic realities of constitutional litigation have re-
sulted in the emergence of a relatively small national civil rights-
civil liberties bar, based largely in major urban centers or in
academe, which is called upon to litigate constitutional cases in nu-
merous states, often simultaneously.24 Were each constitutional
22. I am not suggesting the imposition of compulsory state jurisdiction over constitutional
controversies involving state or local officials, since the proper operation of a concurrent
jurisdiction model assumes a free choice of forum. I am suggesting that if local lawyers begin
to perceive a rough parity between state and federal courts as constitutional enforcement
forums, it would be all to the good.
23. One should not overstate the importance of procedure in choice of forum. Where a
clear perception of substantive superiority exists, a lawyer is unlikely to be diverted from
the substantively superior forum by procedural concerns, unless they act as door-closing
devices. Where the forums are perceived as roughly equivalent, differences in procedure will
exert the strongest influence on choice of forum.
24. The evolution of a decentralized civil rights-civil liberties bar capable of responding
1981]
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case to be litigated under the bewildering array of state procedures
currently in use, the capacity of a relatively small, centralized bar
to respond to complex cases m unfamiliar procedural settings
would be seriously impaired. Thus, as between relatively
equivalent forums, the civil rights-civil liberties bar will and should
gravitate toward a national forum of uniform procedure. To the
extent state courts are concerned with establishing a concurrent
forum capable of attracting a share of constitutional litigation, the
salutary trend toward procedural uniformity, evidenced by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in twenty-three
states,25 should continue. A state that insists on maintaining a pa-
rochial system of procedure should not expect a substantial influx
of constitutional cases.
The Familiarity Principle
Closely allied with, yet distinct from, the uniformity principle is
the tendency of civil rights-civil liberties lawyers to litigate in a
forum with familiar procedures. Obviously, it is easier to master a
single federal rule than to learn the multiple procedural systems
operating in the state courts. Because a sense of procedural famili-
arity is a precondition to careful litigation strategy, many lawyers
are reluctant to pilot a complex constitutional case through unfa-
miliar state procedural shoals.2
The familiarity principle is fed, moreover, not only by the multi-
plicity of state procedures, but by a curious quirk of academe. For
a variety of reasons, some perfectly legitimate, some perfectly fool-
ish, federal procedure is treated as worthy of serious intellectual
concern at our leading law schools, while state procedure, when no-
locally to issues is the goal of each of the major civil rights-civil liberties organizations.
While one cannot underestimate the contributions of local counsel, it has proved extremely
difficult for lawyers m many localities to make a living practicing law on behalf of clients
who cannot pay. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976), is designed to permit the growth of an indigenous civil rights-civil liberties bar. How-
ever, it is too early to know whether the award of fees m appropriate cases will result in the
growth and decentralization of the civil rights-civil liberties bar.
25. See the list compiled in Cox & Newbern, New Civil Procedure: The Court that Came
in from the Code, 33 ARK. L. REv. 1, 2 n.6 (1979).
26. The concern is magnified by the fact that defendant's counsel in a § 1983 case is
generally a state or local government lawyer with substantial expertise in local practice.
[Vol. 22:725
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ticed at all, is relegated to a secondary niche.27 Many, perhaps
most, students of national law schools graduate without ever hav-
ing been exposed to a systematic course in comparative state pro-
cedure. Accordingly, even if they acquire a superficial familiarity
with procedures m one or more states in order to pass the bar ex-
amination, they remain more comfortable with, and better at
manipulating, the conceptual vocabulary of federal procedure.
When a young civil rights-civil liberties lawyer is confronted
with forums of rough substantive comparability, it is natural to ex-
pect the lawyer to tilt toward the forum for which he or she has
been trained. Accordingly, the proper operation of the concurrent
jurisdiction model requires a greater familiarity with state proce-
dures than has generally existed among the civil rights-civil liber-
ties bar. Obviously, as state procedures take on greater uniformity,
familiarity will increase. However, law schools should not await the
emergence of a uniform state-federal procedure. There is no reason
why national law schools, capable of offering an astonishing variety
of courses in an attempt to justify the third year, cannot offer
courses keyed to a comparative examination of state procedural
systems. It is true, given the content of many state procedural
rules, that increased familiarity may breed contempt; but contin-
ued unfamiliarity with state procedures will certainly prolong
avoidance.
The Hospitality Principle
Uniformity and familiarity alone cannot render even a substan-
tively comparable state forum attractive if the governing proce-
dures are hostile to the effective prosecution of a constitutional
case. A civil rights-civil liberties lawyer generally will shun any fo-
rum, state or federal, that:
27. Among the legitimate reasons for favoring federal over state procedure in a law school
with a geographically diverse student body are: (1) a desire to expose students to a body of
law under which all will practice; (2) the existence of a richer academic literature m the area
of federal procedure; (3) the existence of an arguably richer and better written body of case
law; (4) the prevailing philosophy that law school should seek to acquaint students with a
general overview of the problems of procedure rather than seek to teach a series of rules;
and (5) the ability to teach federalism as a by-product of procedure. Unfortunately, a preoc-
cupation with elitism and national status may also translate itself into a disdain for the
study of state procedure.
1981]
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1. imposes burdensome pleading requirements;
2. applies an unfairly short statute of limitations;
3. refuses to acknowledge the importance of class actions;
4. fails to afford broad discovery;
5. imposes archaic notions of immunity, especially executive
immunity;
6. applies technical evidentiary rules in civil cases; and
7. fails to provide for an award of attorney's fees in appropri-
ate circumstances.
Federal procedure is hospitable to the effective prosecution of a
constitutional claim. The generally liberal aspects of notice plead-
ing are at their most permissive when section 1983 complaints are
mvolved. 8 Moreover, federal courts, with few exceptions, are loath
to dismiss a constitutional claim at the pleading stage.29 Statute of
limitations issues generally have been resolved in favor of a reason-
ably long limitations period ranging from three to six years.30 Fed-
eral courts, with few exceptions, have declined to apply potentially
applicable state limitations periods of unreasonably short dura-
28. See, e.g., Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (pleading of
conspiracy in considerable detail without mentioning immunities involved held sufficiently
specific); Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1978) (complaint alleging
conduct violating the Constitution, the time of violation, and listing the responsible officials
deemed sufficiently specific); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1976) (in forma
pauperis affidavit in civil rights case demanded "broadest and most liberal standard of
pleading"); Brook v. Thornburgh, 497 F Supp. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (complaint alleging at-
tempt by officers of the Commonwealth to drive employees from state jobs was not sufficient
to state claim). See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
CIvIL § 1230 (1969 & Supp. 1979).
29. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Brzozowski v. Randall, 281 F Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa.
1968); United States v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 683, 270 F Supp. 233
(S.D. Oluo 1967).
The leading exception to the rule of pleading liberality in § 1983 cases occurs when plain-
tiffs seek to sue superior officers for the misdeeds of subordinates. In the absence of more
than mere conclusory assertion of individual responsibility, courts have dismissed such §
1983 claims at the pleading stage. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Such dismissals are almost always accompanied
by a decision sustaining the complaint as against one or more defendants, thus permitting
discovery which may result m the remstitution of the dismissed claim. See, e.g., Brook v.
Thornburgh, 497 F Supp. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
30. Since Congress has not enacted a statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, federal
courts borrow the most appropriate analogous state limitations period. See notes 268-273 &
accompanying text tnfra. See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Burns v.
Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978); Regan
v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1978).
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tion. 1 Class action practice in federal court, while far from ideal,
recognizes the Rule 23(b)(2) action under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as an integral part of constitutional adjudication.32
Liberal discovery is a hallmark of federal procedure. Executive im-
munity rules are reasonable, 3 and entity liability is a distinct pos-
sibility.3 ' The rules of evidence are codified in a form which simpli-
fies a plaintiff's burden of proof,3 5 and an award of attorney's fees
in a successful case is routine.3 6
When one contrasts the hospitable procedural climate of the fed-
eral courts with the procedures in vogue in certain states, the pro-
cedural impediments to litigating a constitutional case in those
state courts are starkly illustrated. I do not pretend to know
enough state procedure to attempt a state-by-state analysis. The
uniformity and familiarity principles operate equally on law
professors. Instead, I have chosen the state of New York to illus-
trate my point. Other jurisdictions may be more or less procedur-
ally hostile to litigating a constitutional claim. However, I believe
that New York presents a fair basis for comparing state and fed-
eral procedural law.
1. Pleadings
As I have suggested, pleading a section 1983 claim in federal
31. E.g., Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978); Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300
(2d Cir. 1978); Clark v. Louisa County School Bd., 472 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1979); Van
Horn v. Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Va. 1975); Edgerton v. Puckett, 391 F Supp. 463
(W.D. Va. 1975). But see Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1980).
32. See generally C. WRIuoHT & A. MILL-., supra note 28, § 1776.
33. The ground rules governing eleventh amendment immunity are spelled out in Quern
v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445 (1976), Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908). Executive imnunity in § 1983 cases is defined by Virginia Supreme Court v.
Consumers' Union, 100 S. Ct. 1967 (1980), Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), and
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
34. Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980); Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
35. See E. MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 32-33 (1963); S. SALTZBURG & K. RED-
DEN, FEDERAL RULEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 92 (2d ed. 1977). But see Brown, Giveller & Lu-
bin, Treating Blacks as if They Were White: Problems of Definition and Proof in Section
1982 Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 35-42 (1975).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); see, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1977).
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court is a relatively straightforward matter. The federal rules pro-
vide for a single form of action and adopt nontechnical notice
pleading. Moreover, federal courts have properly read civil rights
complaints with a liberality bordering on indulgence.37 It is, unfor-
tunately, considerably more difficult to plead a constitutional case
in a New York court. New York forces a lawyer contemplating con-
stitutional litigation to engage in a complex process of determining
whether the claim sounds in common law mandamus, in which
case it must be pleaded as a petition for relief under Article 78 of
the Civil Practice Law and Rules 8 or whether the claim states a
request for more traditional plenary common law relief, in which
case it must be pleaded as a claim for declaratory and other appro-
priate plenary relief.3 9 As a matter of theory, Article 78 petitions
appear designed to provide speedy relief, in the nature of manda-
mus, from the improper application of the law by an administra-
tive official; plenary actions appear designed to provide relief from
unconstitutional legislative action. The dichotomy works well
enough until an administrative official seeks to apply a statute or
regulation challenged as unconstitutional, or until a plaintiff seeks
to combine a state law challenge with a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the enabling legislation, or until a plaintiff seeks both
equitable and legal relief.'0 Because the theory of common law
mandamus is even less understood today than it was fifty or one
hundred years ago, and because the artificial distinction between
challenges to the application of a law and challenges to the law
itself often proves impossible to apply in practice, the choice of the
appropriate pleading for a constitutional case in a New York court
is often shrouded in mystery. Although choosing the wrong form of
37. See notes 28-29 & accompanying text supra.
38. See generally N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980).
39. See generally Gabnelli & Nonna, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in New
York: An Overview and Survey, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 361 (1978).
40. Examples of confusion over whether to plead a given case as an Article 78 petition or
as a plenary action include: Bey v. Hentel, 36 N.Y.2d 747, 329 N.E.2d 661, 368 N.Y.S.2d 826
(1975); Kovarsky v. Hous. & Dev. Administration, 31 N.Y.2d 184, 286 N.E.2d 882, 335
N.Y.S.2d 383 (1972); Phelan v. Theatrical Protective Union, 22 N.Y.2d 34, 238 N.E.2d 295,
290 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1968); Adams v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 51 A.D.2d 668, 378
N.Y.S.2d 171 (1976); Hoffman v. Poston, 49 A.D.2d 316, 374 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1975); and Jack-
son v. McCabe, 47 A.D.2d 730, 365 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1975). See generally 8 J. WEINSTEIN, H.
KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CrL PRAcTIc 1 7801-02 (1980).
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action should not result in dismissal,41 counsel may find himself
prosecuting a wholly different case with radically different proce-
dural attributes.42 For example, plenary constitutional claims are
governed in New York by no less than a three year and perhaps as
long as a six year statute of limitations.43 Article 78 petitions are
burdened with an absurdly short four month limitations period."
If we assume a hypothetical civil rights lawyer who has made a
judgment that rough substantive parity exists between a New York
and a federal court, the ease of drafting an acceptable and predict-
able federal pleading and the difficulty of drafting a predictable
state pleading will naturally incline the lawyer toward federal
court.
2. Statute of Limitations
The limitations period governing constitutional cases in federal
district courts in New York is either three or six years. 45 The limi-
41. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 103 (McKinney 1972). E.g., Phelan v. Theatrical Protective
Union, 22 N.Y.2d 34, 238 N.E.2d 295, 290 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1968).
42. In addition to the dramatic difference in the length of the limitations period, Article
78 claims suffer from other procedural shortcomings. Since an Article 78 petition is a "spe-
cial proceeding" under New York practice, leave of court must be obtained before engaging
in discovery. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 408 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980). Moreover, since an
Article 78 petition sounds in common law mandamus (or certiorari), doubts exist concerning
the power of an Article 78 court to grant remedies, such as damages and injunctive relief,
which were not associated with a writ of mandamus. E.g., Schwab v. Bowen, 41 N.Y.2d 907,
363 N.E.2d 341, 394 N.Y.S.2d 616 (1977) (damages); Allen v. Eberling, 24 A.D.2d 594, 262
N.Y.S.2d 121 (1965) (damages). See also Ornstem v. Regan, 574 F.2d 115, 118 (2d Cir.
1978); Williams v. Codd, 459 F. Supp. 804, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). On the issue of injunctive
relief, see Plumley v. County of Oneida, 57 A.D.2d 1062, 395 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1977) (denying
relief), Jerry v. Board of Educ., 44 A.D.2d 198, 354 N.Y.S.2d 745 (denying relief), modified
on other grounds, 35 N.Y.2d 534, 324 N.E.2d 106, 364 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1974), and Tuck v.
Heckscher, 65 Misc. 2d 1059, 320 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct.) (recognizing power to grant in-
junction, but denying relief on merits), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 558, 323 N.Y.S.2d 659, af'd, 29
N.Y.2d 288, 277 N.E.2d 402, 327 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1971).
43. New York courts have not ruled on the limitations period governing a claim premised
directly on the constitution since 1895, when the court of appeals ruled that a claim for the
taking of property founded directly on the New York state constitution was governed by the
ten year catch-all period, which has now been shortened to six years. Clark v. Water
Comm'rs, 148 N.Y. 1, 42 N.E. 414 (1895) (current version of statute of limitations at N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAW § 213 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980)).
44. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 217 (McKinney 1972).
45. E.g., Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1977). The argument over whether a
three or six year limitations period should govern § 1983 claims m New York turns on
whether § 1983 is a statute creating a liability within the meaning of § 214(2) of the New
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tations period governing large categories of constitutional litigation
in New York is four months.4 In addition, notice of claim require-
ments often impose de facto limitations periods on the prosecution
of constitutional claims in New York courts, but not in federal
court.47 The refusal of federal courts in New York to apply unrea-
sonably short limitations periods to section 1983 claims mirrors a
national federal tendency to select, as most appropriate, a reasona-
bly long analogous state limitations period to govern constitutional
adjudication in federal court.4 Few lawyers would wish to risk the
imposition of a four month limitations period by bringing their
constitutional claim in a New York state court.
3. Class Actins
One need hardly rehearse the significance of the class action as a
means of effecting institutional change through litigation. In virtu-
ally every setting in which the judiciary has intervened to impose
institutional change on behalf of the politically powerless, the pro-
cedural vehicle has been the Rule 23(b)(2) "prospective" class ac-
tion or, to a lesser extent, the Rule 23(b)(3) "damage" class
action.'9
York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). If so, a three year period governs. However, in
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979), the Supreme Court held
that § 1983 did not create rights. Rather, the Court held, it acted as a procedural vehicle to
enforce preexisting rights. The New York Court of Appeals has held that such conduit stat-
utes do not fall within CPLR § 214(2). State v. Cortelle Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 83, 341 N.E.2d
223, 378 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1975). If CPLR § 214(2) does not govern, the catch-all period of six
years should control the preexisting constitutional liabilities. Clark v. Water Comm'rs, 148
N.Y. 1, 42 N.E. 414 (1895).
46. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 217 (McKinney 1972).
47. Examples of notice of claim statutes lurking in New York practice include N.Y. GEN.
MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1979) (notice of tort claim against public corpo-
ration must be given within 90 days after claim arises) and N.Y. EMPL'Rs LuB. LAW § 2
(McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1979) (notice of injury must be given to employer within 120
days). State notice of claim statutes cannot be used to block a federal cause of action which
does not provide for a notice of claim. El Paso & N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87 (1909)
(local notice of claim statute cannot block Federal Employers' Liability Act action). Notice
of claim statutes, held to be preconditions to suit, are found in other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1175, § 6 (Vernon 1963).
48. See generally Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation,
1976 Amiz. ST. L.J. 97.
49. FED. R. Civ. P 23(b)(2), (3). Litigation seeking institutional reform-educational, pe-
nal, or medical-poses the most obvious example of the importance of the class action.
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Until 1975 New York courts steadfastly clung to an extraordina-
rily narrow vision of the class action.50 In 1975 the New York legis-
lature enacted class action rules modeled closely on Rule 23.51
However, before the ink was dry on the 1975 legislation, the New
York Court of Appeals seriously inhibited the widespread use of
the 23(b)(2) class action in New York by ruling that, in the ab-
sence of special circumstances, challenges to governmental behav-
ior should not be prosecuted as class actions because principles of
stare dectsis afforded sufficient protection to similarly situated
persons. 2 Of course, it was precisely because principles of stare
50. E.g., Onofno v. Playboy Club, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 740, 205 N.E.2d 308, 257 N.Y.S.2d 171
(1965) (Playboy Club members unable to maintain class action); Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15
N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1965) (blacks unable to maintain class action
for improper exclusion from labor union). See also Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33
N.Y.2d 304, 307 N.E.2d 554, 352 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1973); Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396,
259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970). Some states have failed to change their class ac-
tion statutes to parallel the federal rule, continuing to certify classes on the basis of the
"common or general interest" test of the old Field Code of New York. See, e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 27-809 (1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-105 (West 1960); NEB. Rav. STAT. § 25-
319 (1964); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 233 (1971); S.C. CODE § 10-205 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
260.12 (West 1957); FLA. R. Civ. P 1.220 (1967).
51. N.Y. CIrv. PRAc. LAW § 901 (McKinney 1976). A major difference between § 901 and
Rule 23 is the proviso in § 901(b) that the New York class action may not be used to enforce
a penalty. The precise impact of the proviso remains unclear.
52. Bey v. Hentel, 36 N.Y.2d 747, 329 N.E.2d 661, 368 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1975). The court of
appeals stated:
Preliminarily, in Bey we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion on the
part of the courts below to grant class relief since in the circumstances here
presented, governmental operations being involved, on the granting of any re-
lief to the petitioners comparable relief would adequately flow to others simi-
larly situated under principles of stare dectsis.
Id. at 749, 329 N.E.2d at 661, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 827. Cases following Bey in refusing to certify
class relief when governmental action is at stake include: Bauines v. Lavine, 38 N.Y.2d 296,
342 N.E.2d 543, 379 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1975); Brady v. Kelley, 51 A.D.2d 797, 380 N.Y.S.2d 69
(1976); Hoffman v. Poston, 49 A.D.2d 316, 374 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1975); Brown v. Lavine, 49
A.D.2d 49, 371 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1975); and Mazzie v. Staszak, 85 Misc. 2d 24, 379 N.Y.S.2d
624 (Sup. Ct. 1975). See also Beekman-Downtown Hosp. v. Whalen, 44 N.Y.2d 124, 375
N.E.2d 395, 404 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1978); Perez v. Dumpson, 58 A.D.2d 887, 396 N.Y.S.2d 883
(1977); Cohen v. D'Elia, 55 A.D.2d 617, 389 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1976); Community Serv. Soc'y v.
Welfare Inspector Gen., 91 Misc. 2d 383, 398 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 65 A.D. 734, 411
N.Y.S.2d 188 (1977); Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 89 Misc. 2d 342,
393 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
The nadir was reached in Sinhogar v. Parry, 98 Misc. 2d 28, 412 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct.
1979), rev'd, 74 A.D.2d 204, 427 N.Y.S.2d 216, appeal dismissed, 50 N.Y.2d 1022, 410
N.E.2d 746, 431 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1980), when a trial court erroneously declined to certify a
class consisting wholly of similarly situated incompetents.
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decisis, or even preclusion," do not afford adequate protection to
similarly situated persons in constitutional cases that the Rule
23(b)(2) action came into being." Constitutional litigation often
involves a clash of deeply held values. It is overly sanguine to as-
sume that a judicial victory, often in a lower court, will be followed
by a prompt modification of government activity In the absence of
class relief, it has often proved necessary to prosecute multiple ac-
tions to secure widespread bureaucratic compliance.5 5 Where the
plaintiff class consists of poorly educated, politically powerless per-
sons who generally lack both information about their "new" rights
and the means to enforce them, failure to certify a class renders
the practical efficacy of a constitutional precedent a function of the
willingness of the defendants to implement it. Faced with one
court system that routinely certifies and enforces Rule 23(b)(2)
claims and another mi which the availability of class certification is
problematic, civil rights-civil liberties lawyers will opt for the fo-
rum capable of granting the broadest relief.
4. Official Immunty
The evolution of a sensible, logically coherent theory of execu-
tive liability has been one of the unsung triumphs of the current
Supreme Court.5 6 It is now settled that neither federal 7 nor state58
Despite Bey, New York courts have granted class relief in a substantial number of cases.
E.g., Ammon v. Suffolk County, 67 A.D.2d 959, 413 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1979); Knapp v. Michaux,
55 A.D.2d 1025, 391 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1977). See generally J & A Roofing & Siding Co. v. New
York State Dep't of Law, 68 A.D.2d 880, 413 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1979); Eisenstark v. Anker, 64
A.D.2d 924, 408 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1978). However, given Bey and the cases following it, refusal
to certify is a distinct possibility.
53. Given the decline of the mutuality doctrine, I assume that the state would be pre-
cluded by collateral estoppel from seeking to relitigate an issue which it has already lost.
E.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322 (1979).
54. See Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966); 3B MooRi's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02, at 23-52
(2d ed. 1980).
55. Indeed, some question exists as to whether a government defendant, having lost a case
in a lower court, is obliged to modify its behavior vis-&-vis nonparties to the litigation. While
the outcome of future litigation may be foreordained by preclusion, in the absence of addi-
tional litigation, a recalcitrant government may legally, if not morally, simply "stonewall."
56. Briefly summarized, when prospective equitable relief is at issue, neither sovereign
immunity, executive immunity, judicial immunity, nor the eleventh amendment precludes
the issuance of effective relief. E.g., Virgina Supreme Court v. Consumers' Union, 100 S. Ct.
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administrative officials are immune from suit for damages caused
by their unconstitutional actions. Instead, an affirmative defense of
subjective good faith and objective probable cause shields adminis-
trative officials from unwarranted personal liability. 9 Moreover,
even if an individual defendant succeeds in establishing a good
faith defense, the governmental entity whose orders he executed
remains potentially liable.60
In New York, 1 as in many states, 2 the immunity of an executive
1967 (1980); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974);
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). However, legislative immunity may block even pro-
spective relief. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
When compensatory relief is sought, individual defendants performing executive func-
tions may not claim an official immunity. Virginia Supreme Court v. Consumers' Union, 100
S. Ct. 1967 (1980); Wood v. Stnckland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
Instead, they may establish a good faith defense premised on subjective good faith and rea-
sonable belief m legality. Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980). Even if a good faith
defense is established, the governmental defendant may be independently liable for actual
damages caused by the good faith execution of its unconstitutional policies. Owen v. City of
Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978). Individual defendants performing judicial or legislative functions continue, however,
to enjoy a common law immunity. E.g., United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979);
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Whether
a defendant is performing executive, judicial, or legislative roles is to be determined func-
tionally rather than by labels. Thus, executive officials may be entitled to "judicial" immu-
nity for certain adjudicative tasks. E.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Conversely,
judges lose their immunity when they perform executive tasks. E.g., Virginia Supreme Court
v. Consumers' Union, 100 S. Ct. 1967 (1980).
57. E.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1979).
58. E.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
59. Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980).
60. Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980). Of course, if the government
agency falls under the protection of the eleventh amendment, retrospective relief may not
be possible in federal court unless premised on a statutory cause of action that supersedes
the eleventh amendment. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980). See generally
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (§ 1983 is not such a statute); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
When a federal defendant establishes a good faith defense, entity liability may be compli-
cated by notions of sovereign immunity. Federal sovereign immunity has been expressly
waived m connection with a number of torts often associated with law enforcement activity.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
61. E.g., Rottkamp v. Young, 21 A.D.2d 373, 249 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1964), aff'd mem., 15
N.Y.2d 831, 205 N.E.2d 866, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1965).
62. E.g., Malvernia Inv. Co. v. City of Trindad, 123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945 (1951); Wolfe
v. Town of Branford, 22 Conn. Supp. 239, 167 A.2d 924 (1960); City of Elberton v. J.C. Pool
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official from suit turns, not on a pragmatic analysis of where the
loss caused by constitutional tort should fall, but rather on the baf-
fling dichotomy between ministerial acts, for which no immunity
exists, and discretionary acts, which are immune from suit. Few
distinctions have proved as confusing and, ultimately, as useless as
the attempt to distinguish between ministerial and discretionary
acts in determining the scope of tort immunity As a practical mat-
ter, the mmisterial-discretionary dichotomy establishes an uncer-
tain but very real possibility that an ufficial will escape liability for
even a willful violation of the Constitution.6 3 Moreover, because in-
dividual immunity is often linked with a derivative immunity for
the government employer, the net result may be the commission of
a willful constitutional tort causing substantial damage for which
no compensation is possible." Until very recently, New York ad-
hered to precisely such an archaic view of executive immunity.6 5
Accordingly, the ability to secure compensation for constitutional
torts in New York turned on the unpredictable characterization of
the defendant's act as discretionary or ministerial.6 Even if a New
York plaintiff succeeded in labeling a defendant's acts as ministe-
rial, a good faith defense might nonetheless preclude recovery not
only against the "innocent" official, but against the agency which
Realty Co., 111 Ga. App. 765, 143 S.E.2d 407 (1965); Grundy County v. Dyer, 546 S.W.2d
577 (Tenn. 1977). See generally 2 F HARPER & F JAMES, THE LAW OI' TORTS § 29.10 (1956);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW O TORTS § 132 (4th ed. 1971).
63. See, e.g., Rottkamp v. Young, 21 A.D.2d 373, 375, 249 N.Y.S.2d 330, 333 (1964), aff'd
mern., 15 N.Y.2d 831, 205 N.E.2d 866, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1965).
64. Id.
65. Cases applying Rottkamp v. Young, 21 A.D.2d 373, 249 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1964), afl'd
mem., 15 N.Y.2d 831, 205 N.E.2d 866, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1965), include Firelands Sewer &
Water Constr. Co. v. Rochester Pure Waters Dist., 67 A.D.2d 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1979);
Schanbarger v. Kellogg, 35 A.D.2d 902, 315 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1970); VanBuskirk v. Bleiler, 77
Misc. 2d 273, 354 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Harrington v. Norco Fruit Distribs., Inc., 70
Misc. 2d 471, 333 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1972). Of course, Rottkamp recognized an excep-
tion to the immunity rules for deprivations of elective franchise, 21 A.D.2d at 376 n.1, 249
N.Y.S.2d at 334 n.1 (citing Schwartz v. Heffernan, 304 N.Y. 474, 109 N.E.2d 68 (1952)), and
hinted that an exception might apply in civil rights cases generally. Id. See also Francis v.
Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954). The contrast between the uncertain language of
Rottkamp and the rules prevailing in the federal courts is, of course, pronounced.
66. E.g., VanBuskirk v. Bleiler, 77 Misc. 2d 273, 354 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (decision
to deny hearing held to be ministerial, thus permitting recovery). See also 154 East Park
Ave. Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 76 Misc. 2d 445, 350 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (grant-
ing relief), rev'd, 49 A.D.2d 949, 374 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1975) (denying relief).
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employed him. There is some hope that New York has begun to
reexamine its executive immunity-good faith defense rules.6 7 How-
ever, even a cursory comparison of New York's immunity rules
with the immunity doctrine currently prevailing m federal court
would make any lawyer think twice before litigating a constitu-
tional tort case m New York. s
5. Discovery
Given the Supreme Court's increasing emphasis on fact-inten-
sive issues m constitutional cases, discovery may often be critical
in establishing issues such as scienter,e9 personal responsibility, 0
and entity liability.71 No impediment exists to effective and rela-
tively inexpensive discovery in federal court. 2
Discovery in New York is, unfortunately, more difficult. Al-
though nonparty witnesses are subject to full discovery in federal
67. In Teddy's Drive In, Inc. v. Cohen, 47 N.Y.2d 79, 390 N.E.2d 290, 416 N.Y.S.2d 782
(1979), the New York Court of Appeals reversed the refusal of two lower courts to grant
damages for willful government misconduct. The opinion, unfortunately, does not attempt
to reconcile conflicting authority.
68. Broad differences between state and federal immunity doctrines render the subconsti-
tutional tort analysis of Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976), and Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1979), particularly troublesome. Labeling
categories of official misconduct "subconstitutional" not only shifts the forum from federal
to state court, it also may render it impossible to secure redress under the prevailing state
immunity doctrine. Thus, plaintiffs in Paul, Estelle, and Ingraham may well have been
barred by state immunity from seeking effective relief.
69. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
70. E.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975).
71. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
72. Discovery in some states is more limited, while pleading requirements are more severe
than the federal rules. In Illinois, for example, a defendant can request a bill of particulars.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 33 (Smith-Hurd 1968). In contrast, a party can be prevented from
using interrogatories to discover conclusions and contentions. Reske v. Klein, 33 InI. App. 3d
302, 179 N.E.2d 415 (1961).
Discovery in connection with § 1983 cases in federal court often involves an initial phase,
consisting of written interrogatories propounded both to parties and to nonparty witnesses.
Demands for the inspection and copying of relevant documents often accompany the written
interrogatories. A second phase, consisting of oral depositions, may follow. The availability
of written interrogatories and document demands as a precursor to or a substitute for oral
depositions is particularly important m § 1983 cases, because written discovery does not
require substantial cash outlays, while oral discovery generally requires a skilled, relatively
highly paid stenographer.
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court, leave of court must be obtained before deposing a nonparty
witness m New York.7 3 If the New York claim is ultimately charac-
terized as sounding in mandamus, no discovery at all is possible
without leave of court. 4 In addition to the familiar exception of
attorney work product,75 New York recognizes an amorphous privi-
lege for material prepared m anticipation of litigation.76 Whether
such a privilege immunizes information assembled by a govern-
ment defendant m response to a constitutional challenge is un-
clear, but no one would choose to litigate the question m a New
York court when the mformaton is clearly subject to federal dis-
covery. Finally, some doubt exists in New York whether written
interrogatories and oral depositions can be used in connection with
the same witness.7 7 Since the seriatim use of both devices is not
only good litigation strategy, but also saves a great deal of money,
substantial doubt as to the availability of both is yet another factor
impelling New York lawyers to litigate constitutional claims in fed-
eral court.
6. Attorney's Fees
Attorney's fees are recoverable as a matter of course by a pre-
vailing plaintiff in a federal section 1983 action.78 New York, on
the other hand, has not authorized its courts to award attorney's
73. See Dixon v. 80 Pine Street Corp., 516 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1979); Bonito Maritime
Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 68 A.D.2d 864, 414 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1979); Kurzman v.
Burger, 98 Misc. 2d 244, 413 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. 1979). See generally Siegel, Practice
Commentary, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW C3101.22 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1980).
74. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 408 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980). Since an Article 78 pro-
ceeding is denominated a "special proceeding" under New York practice, it falls within the
coverage of CPLR § 408, barring all discovery, except notices to admit, in the absence of
leave of court. E.g., Pasta Chef, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 47 A.D.2d 713, 364 N.Y.S.2d 638
(1975). While leave of court should be freely granted in light of Allen v. Crowell-Collier
Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968), which urged a
liberal discovery policy in New York, a time consuming skirmish can almost certainly be
anticipated over the scope and timing of discovery in an Article 78 proceeding.
75. FED. R. Civ. P 26(b)(3) (codifying Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)).
76. The confusion surrounding the scope of the privilege for material prepared for litiga-
tion i illustrated by Gugluiza v. Gugluimzza, 45 Misc. 2d 868, 257 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
77. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3130 (McKinney Supp. 1980); id. § 3103 (McKinney 1970).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
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fees m constitutional cases. Until very recently, therefore, a pre-
vailing plaintiff in a constitutional case m New York was unable to
recover attorney's fees unless the stringent preconditions of the
American rule were satisfied.7 9 The disparity between the power of
a state or federal court to award fees m constitutional cases hardly
inclined lawyers toward state court.80
However, in Maine v. Thiboutotg1 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that state courts are authorized to award attorney's
fees to successful plaintiffs in connection with section 1983 claims
brought m state as well as federal court, regardless of the prevail-
ing local rule.8 2 Thiboutot, therefore, establishes a degree of proce-
dural parity between state and federal courts on the critical issue
of fee awards.
TOWARD UNIFORM PROCEDURES GOVERNING CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION IN BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
The implications of Thiboutot do not stop with attorney's fees.
Thiboutot points the way toward general procedural parity in con-
stitutional litigation by inviting, and in certain circumstances com-
pelling, state courts to apply collateral rules hospitable to the ef-
fective enforcement of section 1983 claims. Following Thiboutot,
the way is open for state courts to identify and to apply those fed-
eral collateral rules, such as the power to award fees, that are "in-
tegral" to the enjoyment of the federal cause of action.8 3 Such an
79. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); S.
SpmsER, ATToRNEYS' FEEs § 12.3 (1973).
80. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2507 n.12 (1980).
81. 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
82. The Court in Thiboutot held: (1) the phrase "and laws" in § 1983 was intended to
establish a cause of action for the violation of federal statutory, as well as federal constitu-
tional, rights, id. at 2504; and (2) the power to grant attorney's fees was deemed by Congress
"'an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain' compliance with § 1983." Id. at 2507
(quoting S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 5 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmN. NEWS 5908, 5913).
83. I am assuming, as in Thiboutot, that counsel will be careful to plead the § 1983 claim
explicitly in state court. Of course, given traditional notice pleading, if the facts of a case
make out a § 1983 cause of action, the state court is free to recognize the existence of the
federal claim whether or not it has been explicitly pleaded.
Section 1983 is available only in connection with federal constitutional or statutory
claims. Claims based solely on state law grounds will not constitute a § 1983 claim. If one
joins a federal § 1983 claim with a state constitutional claim in state court, however, it is
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approach, which resembles the obverse of the analysis required of
federal courts under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins," should result in
immediate procedural parity in at least two critical areas: attor-
ney's fees awards 5 and the definition of executive immunity.8
Furthermore, this approach provides a framework for a more gen-
eral achievement of procedural parity in constitutional litigation.
In assessing the significance of Thiboutot as a vehicle for achiev-
Ing procedural parity, two issues must be confronted. First, are
state courts obliged to entertain a section 1983 cause of action, and
second, what are the collateral federal rules, if any, that such a
federal cause of action imports into state practice?
As a matter of logic, state jurisdiction over section 1983 claims
should be approached in two stages: first, whether state courts may
entertain a section 1983 claim, and second, whether they must.
Under current Supreme Court guidelines, however, the "may" and
the "must" have been collapsed into a single issue. If Congress per-
mits a state court to entertain a section 1983 claim, it must.
The Presumption of Concurrency
When Congress enacted section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871,7 the precursor of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it obviously intended to
provide freedmen with a federal cause of action for violation of
rights, both statutory and constitutional, conferred upon them by
the Reconstruction Congresses. Over the years, section 1983 has
been judicially expanded" until today it provides a federal cause
of action for the violation of virtually all federal constitutional and
most federal statutory rights.
possible that the entire litigation will enjoy the favorable procedures applicable to the §
1983 claim. For an example, see McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958),
discussed at note 210 infra.
84. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The first use of the phrase "converse Erie" to describe the process
of applying federal collateral rules m state FELA cases occurred in Hill, note 3 supra.
85. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
86. Martinez v. California, 100 S. Ct. 553 (1980).
87. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
88. The principal substantive expansions of § 1983 occurred in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961) (activities in violation of state law within scope of § 1983), Lynch v. Household
Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (§ 1983 protects both personal and property rights), and
Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980) (§ 1983 protects statutory as well as constitu-
tional rights).
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Jurisdiction over the newly established federal cause of action
was lodged in an appropriate federal court.89 Congress said noth-
ing, however, about whether section 1983 claims were also cogniza-
ble m state court.90 Moreover, while the legislative history of sec-
tion 1983 bristles with statements urging access to federal court,
nothing in the legislative history sheds light on whether Congress
wished the access to be exclusive.
When, as with section 1983, Congress has created a federal right
and has provided for federal jurisdiction to enforce it, the Supreme
Court has consistently presumed that Congress did not intend to
oust state courts of concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the federal
claim.91 Such a presumption of concurrent jurisdiction may be
89. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The 1871 Act read:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any per-
son within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United
States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such pro-
ceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United
States.
Id.
90. During the 1873-74 recodification, Congress dropped the original jurisdictional phrase
"such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United
States" and added a separate jurisdictional provision. Rav. STAT. § 1979 (1875) (now codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. II 1979)). See generally REv. STAT. § 563(12) (1875)
(district court jurisdiction); Rav. STAT. § 629(16) (1875) (circuit court jurisdiction). See also
REV. STAT. § 699(4) (1875) (Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction). Thus, the original section
1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was divided into four statutes: Rav. STAT. §§ 1979, 563(12),
629(16), and 699(4), each with troublesome changes in wording. Several courts have found
the change persuasive evidence of a congressional intent to establish concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. E.g., Young v. Board of Educ., 416 F. Supp. 1139 (D.
Colo. 1976); Brown v. Pritchess, 13 Cal. 3d 518, 531 P.2d 772, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975). It is
true that the continued existence of a similar phrase was deemed by the Supreme Court to
establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over Clayton Act claims. General Inv. Co. v. Lake
Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261 (1922). My own view is that the congressional intent
associated with the 1873-74 recodification is so equivocal that I would be loath to draw
dramatic conclusions from changes in organizational structure. See Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 446 U.S. 600, 623 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Maine v. Thiboutot,
100 S. Ct. 2502, 2508 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
91. The presumption of concurrent jurisdiction flows initially from Alexander Hamilton's
assertion that "the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State courts would have a
concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the Union, where it was not
expressly prohibited." THE FEDEaLIST No. 82, 514 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
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overcome only by an express or necessarily implied congressional
assertion of exclusive jurisdiction.9 2 Thus, in Houston v. Moore,9"
the Court applied the presumption to uphold the constitutionality
of a Pennsylvania statute providing for concurrent jurisdiction to
punish persons for failing to respond to a federal militia levy. In
CIaflin v. Houseman," the Court discussed the presumption at
length in holding that states possessed concurrent jurisdiction to
entertain litigation involving bankrupts. In Robb v. Connolly,95 the
Court applied the presumption to uphold the exercise of state con-
current habeas corpus jurisdiction in challenges to extradition pro-
cedures. In United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co.," the
Court noted that the grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts in
cases in which the United States is a party-plaintiff9P7 did not pre-
clude the exercise of concurrent state jurisdiction. 8 In Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney,99 the Court recognized concurrent jurisdiction in
the state courts to enforce principles of federal labor law distilled
from section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act in the
wake of Lincoln Mills.100 Most recently, in Sullivan v. Little Hunt-
Cases applying the presumption include: Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229
(1969); Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); United States v. Bank of New York
& Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463 (1936); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884); Claflin v. House-
man, 93 U.S. 130 (1876); and Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). See also Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 626 (1842) (Taney, C.J., concurring); id. at 633
(Thompson, J., concurring); id. at 650 (Daniel, J., concurring). See generally Redish &
Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. Rnv. 311
(1976); Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1551 (1960).
92. General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261 (1922) (Clayton Act).
Rare examples of nonexplicit situations calling for exclusive federal jurisdiction may be
found in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), and Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); td. at 608 (Story, J., plurality opinion); td. at 636
(Wayne, J., concurring); id. at 658 (McLean, J., concurring). See also Abelman v. Booth, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
93. 18 (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
94. 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
95. 111 U.S. 624 (1884).
96. 296 U.S. 463 (1936).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
98. See also California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 66-68 (1979).
99. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
100. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (construing 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1976)). In Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court held that federal courts were empowered to
fashion a federal common law of labor relations within the interstices of section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act. But see Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
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rng Park,101 the Court noted with apparent approval the concur-
rent jurisdiction of state courts to enforce housing discrimination
claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1982.02
On the other hand, the few examples of refusal to recognize pre-
sumed concurrent jurisdiction seem clearly distmgushable. In
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,'0 five members of the Court 04 ruled that
states were without power to enact legislation establishing concur-
rent jurisdiction to enforce the fugitive slave clause 05 of the Con-
stitution. Given the unique attributes of the fugitive slave clause
discussed by Justice Story"°8 and the intensely emotional overtones
of Prigg, 0 7 it is hardly persuasive federalism law today. In San Di-
ego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, o10  the Court ruled that
state courts were not free to adjudicate claims which would consti-
358 U.S. 354 (1959) (declining to apply similar reasoning to admiralty claims).
101. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
102. Id. at 238.
103. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
104. Justice Story wrote for himself and for Justices Catron and McKinley, id. at 608, and
Justices McLean, id. at 658, and Wayne, id. at 636, concurred separately.
105. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
106. The peculiar importance of uniform application of the Fugitive Slave Law, coupled
with the fact that free states nght well be hostile to its enforcement, led Justice Story to
argue that the Fugitive Slave Law was the exclusive province of the federal government. 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) at 622.
107. Pngg was a cornerstone of abolitionist legal strategy, which initially sought to funnel
rendition proceedings into state courts unsympathetic to the slave-owner. In Prngg, Penn-
sylvania had passed an antikidnapping statute forbidding slave-catchers from removing sus-
pected fugitives from the state in the absence of judicial authorization. Since the federal
courts were geographically inaccessible, the practical effect of the Pennsylvania statute was
to force rendition proceedings into Pennsylvania state courts.
The Supreme Court invalidated the statute as an interference with a slave-owner's consti-
tutional right of recaption. The Court divided along proslavery and antislavery lines, how-
ever, on the question of whether any state judicial role in the rendition process was permis-
sible. The antislavery wing of the Court, led by Justice Story, argued that states should play
no role in the process, forcing the slave-owner to seek, when necessary, judicial relief in
geographically remote federal courts. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 615-16. The proslavery wing, led
by Chief Justice Taney, argued that states possessed concurrent jurisdiction to aid in the
rendition process. Id. at 627.
Justice Story's positon led several free states to seek to close their courts to fugitive slave
claims. The constitutionality of the Personal Liberty Laws, closing state courts to fugitive
slave claims, is discussed at notes 118-123, 167 infra. Whatever the legal merits of the strat-
egy, it failed as a political matter, since the Compromise of 1850 established a federal corps
of quasi-judicial slave commissioners to provide a federal enforcement apparatus for the
fugitive slave clause. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
108. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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tute unfair labor practices under sections 7 and 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act.109 Instead, such claims must fall within the
exclusive primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board. However, Garmon should be contrasted with Dowd Box Co.
v. Courtney,"' where the Court, m the absence of a federal admin-
istrative scheme, recognized concurrent state jurisdiction over
post-Lincoln Mills federal labor law claims which would not con-
stitute unfair labor practices. Moreover, m Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n,111 the Court further narrowed Garmon by holding that cases
involving acts which constitute both unfair labor practices and sec-
tion 301 violations were within the state courts' concurrent
jurisdiction.
Given the Supreme Court's consistent application of the pre-
sumption of concurrent jurisdiction, the Court's rather casual rec-
ognition in Maine v. Thiboutot11 2 and Martinez v. California1
that state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction to enforce section
1983 claims comes as no surprise. 1 4 After deciding the "may" is-
109. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1976).
110. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
111. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
112. 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
113. 100 S. Ct. 553 (1980).
114. The Court had hinted at its decision m Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 36 n.17
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Jones v. Hilderbrandt, 432 U.S. 183 (1977) (per
curiam).
State courts have consistently exercised concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. E.g.,
New Times, Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 367, 519 P.2d 169 (1974); Brown v.
Pritchess, 13 Cal. 3d 518, 531 P.2d 772, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975); Silverman v. University of
Colo., 36 Colo. App. 269, 541 P.2d 93 (1975); Bohacs v. Reid, 63 IM. App. 3d 477, 379 N.E.2d
1372 (1978); Alberty v. Daniel, 25 IlM. App. 3d 291, 323 N.E.2d 110 (1974); Hirych v. State,
376 Mich. 384, 136 N.W.2d 910 (1965); Dudley v. Bell, 50 Mich. App. 678, 213 N.W.2d 805
(1973); Brody v. Leamy, 90 Misc. 2d 1, 393 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Commonwealth ex
rel. Saunders v. Creamer, 464 Pa. 2, 4 n.3, 345 A.2d 702, 703 n.3 (1975); Terry v. Kolski, 78
Wisc. 2d 475, 254 N.W.2d 704 (1977). See also Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P.2d 873 (Alas. 1979);
Thorpe v. Durango School Dist., 41 Colo. App. 473, 591 P.2d 1329 (1978), af'd, - Colo. -,
614 P.2d 880 (1980); Ramirez v. County of Hudson, 169 N.J. Super. 455, 404 A.2d 1271 (Ch.
Div. 1979); James v. Board of Educ., 37 N.Y.2d 891, 894, 340 N.E.2d 735, 737, 378 N.Y.S.2d
371, 373 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); Young v. Toia, 66 A.D.2d 377, 413 N.Y.S.2d 530
(1979); Lange v. Nature Conservancy, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 416, 601 P.2d 963 (1979); Board
of Trustees v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1978).
Two state courts have declined to exercise jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. Backus v.
Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 224 S.E.2d 370 (1976) (partial); Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25,
442 S.W.2d 248 (1969). However, the rationale of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Cham-
berlain, which turned on a presumed grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts,
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sue, the Court in Martinez purported to reserve the question of
whether states "must" entertain section 1983 claims.115 However,
having decided that states "may," the "must" inevitably follows."'
The Antidiscrimination Principle
The Supreme Court has considered the obligation of a state
court to enforce a federal claim on at least six occasions.""" In Prigg
v. Pennsylvana,18 Justice Story, writing for three members of the
Court, 1 9 suggested that Congress lacked power to confer concur-
rent jurisdiction over fugitive slave claims. 12 0 Three members of
the Court apparently disagreed, holding that states were vested
seems undercut by the Supreme Court's recognition m Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502
(1980), that jurisdiction over § 1983 clams is not exclusive.
115. 100 S. Ct. at 558 n.7.
116. Although the Court has reversed the question, it has come very close to deciding that
§ 1983 claims must be entertained m state courts of general jurisdiction. Writing for a unan-
imous Court, Justice Stevens noted:
We have never considered the question of whether a State must entertain
a clain under § 1983. We note that where the same type of claim, if arising
under state law, would be enforced in the state courts, the state courts are
generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim.
Id.
117. Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950) (FELA claims); Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (Emergency Price Control Act treble damage claims); McKnett v.
St. Louis & S.F Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934) (FELA clains); Douglas v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929) (FELA clams); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S.
1 (1912) (FELA claims); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (fugitive slave
claims). See also Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 315 U.S. 698 (1942); Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
118. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
119. Justice Story delivered the opinion of the Court in Prigg. Id. at 608. His opinion was
joined by Justices Catron and McKinley. Chief Justice Taney, id. at 626, and Justices
Thompson, td. at 633, Wayne, id. at 636, Daniel, id. at 650, and McLean, id. at 658, each
filed separate opinions. Justice Baldwin concurred only in the result. Id. at 636.
120. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302, conferred jurisdiction to enforce
the clais of slave-owners on both federal and state courts. Id.
Justice Story's position would have emasculated the 1793 Act, since access to a federal
court was more often than not geographically impossible. However, Justice Story upheld a
slave-owner's right to resort to self-help, so long as a breach of the peace did not ensue. 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) at 613.
Thus, the net effect of his opinion was to afford some protection only to fugitives who
could resist self-help either by themselves or with the aid of sympathetic whites. It fell far
short, however, of the hopes of the abolitionist bar. See generally R. CovWR, JusTics Ac-
cusun (1975).
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with concurrent power to enforce the fugitive slave clause." 1 Jus-
tice McLean explicitly disagreed, holding that Congress could im-
pose concurrent jurisdiction on state courts.122 Justices Wayne and
Baldwin, while agreeing that states could not legislate in the area,
did not discuss the power of Congress to confer concurrent juris-
diction on the states.123
Were Pngg the only case in the area, Justice Story's opinion
would cast considerable doubt on any attempt to impose obligatory
concurrent jurisdiction on state courts to enforce federal rights.2
121. Although the opinions of Chief Justice Taney and Justices Thompson and Daniel
explicitly approve state legislation designed to enforce the clause, they are silent on the
validity of congressional legislation conferring obligatory concurrent jurisdiction on state
courts. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 626, 633, 650.
122. Id. at 666. The practical value of Justice McLean's recognition that Congress pos-
sessed power to confer concurrent jurisdiction over fugitive slave clamis was greatly lessened
by his observation that no mechanism existed to force states to comply. Id.
Of the opinions in Pgg, Justice McLean's comes closest to fulfilling the hopes of the
abolitionist bar. He condemned self-help and commented that he would have upheld state
legislation prohibiting the removal of an alleged fugitive without judicial warrant. Moreover,
he forbade states from enacting legislation designed to aid slave-catchers and suggested that
state courts could refuse to cooperate with a slave-catcher. Id. at 668-73.
Under Justice McLean's opinion, fugitives able to resist self-help could be removed from a
state only upon the warrant of a geographically inaccessible federal judge or a local judge
willing to participate m the process. Fugitives unable to resist self-help could be removed
from a state only if local authorities refused to cooperate in obtaining judicial sanction. If
local authorities were willing to cooperate, a slave-catcher could not remove his prey until
judicial remedies under the 1793 Act, either state or federal, had been exhausted. Id. at 668-
71. Since access to the federal forum was often impracticable, most rendition proceedings
would unfold m a state court presumably sympathetic to the fugitive.
123. Id. at 636-50. Justice Baldwin did not write a separate opinion, arguing that since
the alleged fugitive in Pngg, Mary Morgan, was concededly a runaway, no basis existed to
consider whether self-help could be used in a contested case.
Justice Baldwin's suggestion that no real case or controversy existed in Pngg is compel-
ling. Mary Morgan had long since been returned to slavery. The indictment against Prigg,
the slave-catcher, was pro forma designed merely to test the constitutionality of the Penn-
sylvama statute barring self-help. The case had all the earmarks of a request for an advisory
opinion by Pennsylvania and Maryland. Justice Wayne noted, however, that Justice Bald-
win agreed with Justice Story that states lacked power to enforce the clause. Id. at 637.
124. Of course, Prigg is, to say the least, an equivocal precedent since four members of
the Court appeared to support Congress' power to establish concurrent jurisdiction (Chief
Justice Taney and Justices Thompson, Daniel and McLean), while only three appeared to
oppose it (Justices Story, Catron and McKinley). Justices Wayne and Baldwin, caught be-
tween personal aversion to slavery and principled commitment to strong federal power, re-
mained silent.
Any student of Pnigg is deeply indebted to Robert Cover for his extraordinary study of
antislavery judges and their role in the enforcement of the fugitive slave clause. R. CovR,
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However, in Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail-
road,125 Justice Story's analysis was rejected by a unanimous
Court. In Mondou, Connecticut state courts had declined to enter-
tain a claim based on the newly enacted Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act (FELA)126 on the ground that the modified defenses es-
tablished by the Act were in violation of Connecticut's public
policy and would force Connecticut courts to apply radically differ-
ent rules to railway accidents depending upon whether the plaintiff
was engaged in intrastate or interstate commerce. 27 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that, because Connecticut courts were
vested with conceded jurisdiction over analogous state law claims,
they could not discriminatorily refuse to entertain a federal claim
merely because Connecticut disagreed with the federal policies un-
derlying it.12a The Court was careful to couch its opinion, not in
terms of an affirmative obligation to provide a forum for federal
claims, but rather as a negative prohibition on discriminating
against plaintiffs asserting federal claims. 29
The antidiscrimination rationale of Mondou was applied in
Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad"5 0 and Mc-
Knett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway.13 1 In McKnett, Ala-
supra note 120. I am also grateful for the assistance of my colleague, William Nelson, in
helping me to understand the issues raised by the abolitionist bar. See generally Nelson,
The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nine-
teenth Century America, 87 HARv. L. Rnv. 513 (1974).
125. 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
126. Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908). Congress, m enacting the FELA, intended to
provide a federal cause of action to railroad employees injured while engaged in interstate
commerce. An earlier version, covering all railroad employees whether or not engaged in
interstate commerce, had been invalidated by the Supreme Court in The Employers' Liabil-
ity Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
The Act's primary purpose appears to have been to override certain state defenses, such
as the fellow-servant rule and contributory negligence, which prevented recovery by some
injured employees.
127. Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 82 Conn. 373, 73 A. 762 (1909), rev'd, 223 U.S.
1 (1912).
128. 223 U.S. at 59. As with the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, the grant of concurrent juris-
diction in the second FELA was explicit. Congress reinforced the explicit grant of concur-
rent jurisdiction in FELA cases with an antiremoval provision. Pub. L. No. 61-117, 36 Stat.
291 (1910) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1976)). See generally Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 315
U.S. 698 (1942).
129. 223 U.S. at 56-59.
130. 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
131. 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
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bama declined to entertain FELA claims by nonresidents against
foreign corporations, while accepting similar state-law-based claims
brought by similarly situated plaintiffs. Because the discrimiation
against federally based claims was blatant, the Court applied Mon-
dou and required Alabama to entertain the claim."- 2
However, in Douglas, a New York statute authorized its courts
to decline to entertain any transitory action, state or federal, be-
tween a nonresident plaintiff and a foreign corporation. Pursuant
to the statute, a New York court declined to accept an FELA claim
by a nonresident plaintiff against the New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad because it was incorporated in Delaware. The
Supreme Court affirmed, since New York treated all claims, state
and federal, identically.133 Had Mondou established an affirmative
obligation rather than a prohibition on discrimination, New York
courts would not have been free to decline to entertain a claim
which was properly venued under the FELA, solely on the fiction
that the New York,. New Haven & Hartford Railroad was a foreign
corporation.'"
In Testa v. Katt 1 5 the Court purported to apply Mondou to
require Rhode Island to entertain a federal treble damage claim
based on wartime Emergency Price Control Act regulations" ' be-
cause Rhode Island courts were authorized to enforce similar
Rhode Island claims. 13 7 However, the rationale adopted by Justice
Black in Testa for a unanimous Court appears to have expanded
Mondou in two significant directions. First, the Court's opinion
does not appear to turn on whether Congress explicitly provided
132. Id. at 232-33.
133. 279 U.S. at 387-88.
134. The FELA provided injured plaintiffs with very liberal venue and choice of forum
rules. See generally Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 315 U.S. 698 (1942); Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941). The plaintiff m Douglas fell comfortably within them. Of
course, to suggest that Douglas fails to give an FELA plaintiff the full enjoyment of his
FELA claim by truncating his choice of forum is not to suggest that the virtually unlimited
choice of forum granted by the FELA is necessarily wise.
135. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
136. Emergency Price Control Act, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (1942), as amended by
Act of June 30, 1944, Pub. L. No. 383, 58 Stat. 632.
137. Rhode Island courts had already enforced claims for double damages arising under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). See Newman v. George A. Fuller Co., 72 R.I. 113, 48
A.2d 345 (1946). The court did not specify a Rhode Island based claim which the Rhode
Island courts would have entertained.
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for state court jurisdiction. Rather, Justice Black invoked the pre-
sumption of concurrent jurisdiction discussed m Claflin v. House-
man 38 and linked it to the antidiscrimination principle announced
in Mondou to create a de facto obligation on the part of state
courts to enforce federal claims.139 Second, the Court found a vio-
lation of the antidiscrimmation principle merely because Rhode Is-
land courts were empowered to entertain generically similar, as op-
posed to factually identical, state law claims. 40
After Testa, whenever the presumption of concurrent jurisdic-
tion establishes state power to entertain a federal claim, a state
will violate the antidiscrimination principle of Mondou if it de-
clines to exercise the concurrent power, while continuing to em-
power its courts to entertain generically similar state law claims.
By linking the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction to an expan-
sive view of what constitutes discriminatory treatment, the Court
m Testa imposed a de facto obligation on state courts to entertain
those federal claims which Congress has not explicitly confided to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Of course, the an-
tidiscrimmation rationale continues to provide a narrow escape
valve. Thus, in Missoun ex rel. Southern Railway v. Mayfield,'41
the Court reverted to its analysis in Douglas and upheld the appli-
cation to FELA cases of a Missouri statute which forbade Missouri
courts from entertaining any transitory claim, state or federal,
138. 93 U.S. 130 (1876). See also note 90 supra.
139. It was unnecessary to revoke the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction in Testa,
since Congress had explicitly provided for concurrent state jurisdiction. "The district courts
shall have jurisdiction of crimnnal proceedings and, concurrently with State and Terri-
torial courts, of all other proceedings under section 205 of this Act." Emergency Price Con-
trol Act, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. at 33 (1942).
140. The discrmnation condemned in Mondou and McKnett involved two sets of identi-
cal tort claims based on identical facts. Thus, the sole basis for discrimination in Mondou
was a disagreement with the policy underlying the federal claim.
The discrimination condemned in Testa was more attenuated. No precisely analogous
state cause of action existed and the only example of discriminatory activity cited by the
Supreme Court was Rhode Island's willingness to entertain double damage claims under the
FLSA. 330 U.S. at 394 & n.12. The actual discrimination m Testa thus was not between
state and federal claims, but between types of federal claims. Of course, the potential for
discrimination in favor of state claums was present, since Rhode Island courts possessed
power to hear "penalty" cases. Testa, therefore, involved only a potential discrimination
against generically similar federal claims, while in Mondou the discrimination was actual
and involved precisely the same subject matter as the federal claum.
141. 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
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brought by a nonresident plaintiff against a forefgn corporation.
However, as applied to section 1983 claims, the safety valve gives a
state scant comfort, since it is highly unlikely that any state will
take itself out of the business of adjudicating state and federal
constitutional claims. Because each state will continue to enforce
state and federal constitutional claims in their respective courts,
no state may decline to afford a similar judicial forum to section
1983 plaintiffs. And, while the Supreme Court has been careful to
reserve the question, it has recognized that the issue of obligatory
state jurisdiction over section 1983 claims is virtually foreclosed by
a combination of the presumption of concurrency and the prohibi-
tion on discrinination against federal clainants.142
Although I applaud the result nposed by Testa, I am more than
a little troubled by the process. First, the linkage of the presump-
tion of concurrency with a broad antidiscrimmation principle ap-
pears to render potentially significant variations in congressional
language superfluous because the same results appear to follow
whether or not Congress has explicitly provided for state judicial
enforcement of a given federal right. It is one thing to indulge in a
presumption that Congress always intends to vest concurrent juris-
diction in state courts when the consequences to the states are per-
missive; it is quite another when the inevitable consequence of
such a presumption is to impose de facto obligatory jurisdiction.
Moreover, it is one thing for a state to decline to adjudicate a fed-
eral claim when Congress is silent about choice of forum; it is quite
another to override an explicit congressional forum choice. 4 s If ob-
ligatory jurisdiction is to be imposed in the absence of explicit con-
gressional language, or if obligatory jurisdiction is to be avoided in
the teeth of explicit congressional language, it should be pursuant
to a more convincing analysis.
More fundamentally, cases like Testa mask a difficult substan-
tive judgment behind a facade of equality The extent to which
federal rights must be enforced in state courts poses a fundamental
142. Martinez v. California, 100 S. Ct. 553, 558 n.7 (1980). See note 116 supra.
143. Each of the cases imposing obligatory, as opposed to permissive, state jurisdiction
over federal claims involved explicit congressional grants of concurrent jurisdiction. See
generally Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (Emergency Price Control Act); Mondou v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912); Pngg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539
(1842) (Fugitive Slave Act of 1793).
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issue of federalism which deserves to be considered on its own
merits. The antidiscrimination solution embraced by the Court
frees it from being forced to grapple with a difficult substantive
federalism issue and avoids the necessity of a potentially contro-
versial opinion. After all, it is hard to argue with the antidis-
crimination principle. Unfortunately it also deprives the system of
a carefully considered answer to an important federalism issue,
substituting instead a facile formula which imposes a de facto obli-
gatory jurisdiction without really thinking about whether, and
under what circumstances, such jurisdiction should exist.14 4
The Affirmatwe Duty Model
In fact, when the question of obligatory state jurisdiction over
federal section 1983 claims is confronted directly, it stands on its
own feet without a nondiscrimination crutch. The structure of the
Constitution itself and the lessons of history combine to demon-
strate that state courts are the residual judicial organs of the fed-
eral union, with presumed responsibility to enforce the "Constitu-
tion, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof.1 4 5
144. Using antidiscrimnation principles to erect de facto substantive rules is hardly con-
fined to esoteric questions such as state jurisdiction over federal causes of action. For exam-
ple, the Court has compensated for an embarrassing lapse in our Constitution-it says virtu-
ally nothing about the right to vote-by using the equal protection clause to fill the void.
E.g., Dunn v. Blumstem, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Similarly, troublesome first amendment questions have been avoided, and covertly re-
solved, by couching them in nondiscrimnation terms. E.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92 (1972). Whatever benefits may flow from such mental gymnastics-and I confess that I
have applauded the short-term results--we would be better off confronting the underlying
issues directly and resolving them openly.
It is not at all clear that tying voting rights to the vagaries of equal protection law is the
best way to secure the right to vote. After all, a substantive right to vote could easily have
been found in the first amendment or the guaranty clause. Nor am I comfortable with
resolving free speech questions by converting them into discrimination cases, since, taken at
its word, such an analysis would tolerate widespread censorship, so long as it were equally
applied.
145. Article VI of the Constitution, the supremacy clause, provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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As a matter of textual interpretation, the language of the
supremacy clause itself obviously contemplates the existence of a
broadly based state responsibility over federal claims. There would
hardly have been a need to bind the "Judges in every State" if the
draftsmen of the Constitution had not contemplated that much, if
not all, litigation involving federal claims would unfold in state
courts. Moreover, because state trial courts were and still are typi-
cally courts of general jurisdiction, there was no need to tack a
specific jurisdictional provision onto article VI because, under
widely shared assumptions, courts of general jurisdiction are pre-
sumed to be empowered to decide all cases not specifically forbid-
den them.1 46 Finally, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury
v. Madison1 47 illustrates the view of judicial responsibility in vogue
when the Constitution was adopted. Under the Marbury model, a
judge is essentially passive until someone deposits a case within his
jurisdiction on his doorstep. Once such an event occurs, the judge
becomes obliged to resolve the case by announcing which of the
conflicting sources of law advanced by the parties is to take prece-
dence. In exercising such a responsibility, a state judge could not
be forbidden from looking to potential federal sources of law, even
by an explicit prohibition.
If one links the language of article VI with prevailing notions of
the jurisdictional reach of state courts of general jurisdiction with
the Marbury vision of a judge's obligation to search out governing
law, a persuasive case can be made that the Framers probably
viewed state jurisdiction over federal claims as presumptively obli-
gatory, subject only to a congressional decision to create exclusive
federal jurisdiction.
Moreover, apart from the probable assumptions of the Founders,
the institution of judicial review itself suggests the existence of
presumptively obligatory state jurisdiction. Judicial review consists
of the substitution of the judiciary's view of the meaning of a given
provision of the Constitution and/or laws for that of a legislative or
executive official. 148 As such, it substitutes the decision of a
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
146. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 2 (1972).
147. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
148. Marbury presents an example of the various aspects of judicial review since it com-
bines judicial review of legislative action on constitutional grounds and a request for judicial
[Vol. 22:725
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nonmajoritarian, or at least less majoritarian, official for that of
more democratically responsible officials. However, the jurisdiction
of the federal courts is subject to plenary control by the very
majoritarian forces whose will the courts must question. Article
I11114 leaves to the shifting fortunes of majority rule the question of
whether inferior federal courts should exist at all and what their
jurisdiction should be. A generation of law students is now familiar
with Henry Hart's demonstration of the theoretical fragility of fed-
eral judicial review. 50 Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall's construc-
tion of article I m Marbury has rendered even the appellate ju-
risdiction of the Supreme Court vulnerable to majoritarian
attack. 5" Thus, no guarantee exists that a federal judiciary will ex-
review of executive action on nonconstitutional grounds. While we often treat judicial review
as if it were confined to constitutional situations, in fact, most judicial review takes place in
a nonconstitutional context.
149. Article I of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and m such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.
Section 2.
In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fac, with such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
150. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 330-60 (quoting Hart, The Power of Congress
to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HA~v. L. REV.
1362 (1953)). See also Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the
Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts, 124 U. PA. L. Rv. 45 (1975).
151. In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall construed article Mi, § 2, cl. 2 to provide Con-
gress with plenary control over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. While the
Marbury construction is plausible-perhaps even compelling-an alternative construction
exists that would read the final fragment of the second clause as providing Congress with
power to alter the balance of original and appellate jurisdiction, but would forbid Congress
from wholly removing particular issues from the cognizance of the Supreme Court. Such a
construction would read the "exceptions" and "regulations" phrase as modifying the entire
clause rather than merely the second sentence. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note
19, at 79-80 (2d Supp. 1977); Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DuKE L.J. 1. Recent unsuccessful majoritaran attacks on the jurisdiction of the lower fed-
eral courts include: S. 450, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979) (no review of any state law that
related to "voluntary prayers in public schools"); S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (no
review of the highest state court decision admitting in evidence a confession as voluntary);
H.R. 11,926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (no review of state apportionment); and S. 2648,
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ist to carry out a central function of our constitutional govern-
ment-judicial review. State courts, the residual judicial organ of
the federal union, should, therefore, be viewed as vested with an
essential bedrock responsibility to act as the only secure organ of
judicial review.152 For the first one hundred years of the Republic,
general federal question jurisdiction did not exist.153 Thus, prior to
1875, state courts were the only forum in which certain federal
rights could be enforced. It is highly unlikely that the Framers in-
tended to permit, in effect, each state to veto a substantive deci-
sion of Congress or to nullify the impact of a constitutional provi-
sion by selectively cutting off access to the only judicial forum
available to enforce it. Nor is such a concern merely historical.
Even today, important federal rights exist which may be enforced
only in state courts.
Until recently, a federal claim which failed to satisfy the juris-
dictional amount imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)1 54 was enforcea-
ble, if at all, only in a state court. After a Byzantine evolution,155
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (no review of any state antisubversive statutes).
152. Of course, state courts are also vulnerable to majoritarian attacks on their jurisdic-
tion. However, assuming the worst, federal courts may be swept away or severely hamstrung
by a hostile congressional majority. State courts then would remain subject only to local
majoritanan pressure and, given the noncontroversial nature of much state judicial activity,
total abolition of a state's courts is not a serious possibility. Moreover, state courts often
find more tangible support for their existence in their state constitutions. Finally, piecemeal
attempts to prevent a state court from enforcing federal constitutional rights would proba-
bly run afoul of a genume nondiscrimnation principle.
153. General federal question jurisdiction was not established until 1875. Act of March
1875, ch. 136, 18 Stat. 470. An abortive Federalist attempt to establish general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction in the Midnight Judges Bill, Act of Feb. 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89, was repealed
by the Jeffersomans. See generally Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 298, 299-308 (1803).
154. Until 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) provided:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of in-
terest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States, except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such
action brought against the United States, any agency, thereof, or any officer or
employee thereof m his official capacity.
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) (amended 1980). The 1976 amendments to § 1331(a) eliminated
the jurisdictional amount in many actions against federal defendants. The jurisdictional
amount continued to apply to actions against state and local government officials until 1980.
See notes 163-165 & accompanying text infra. The very existence of a jurisdictional amount
exemplified a congressional assumption that state courts would hear those cases falling
outside the jurisdictional amount.
155. In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979), the Court ruled
1981] PROCEDURAL PARITY
the Supreme Court ruled that allegations by welfare recipients that
state or local officials have violated the restrictions contained in
the Social Security Act make out a cause of action under section
1983;156 such claims, however, fall outside the jurisdictional grant
of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). 57 Because the Court has declined to per-
mit welfare recipients to aggregate their claims for jurisdictional
purposes,158 and because, even if the $10,000 jurisdictional amount
of section 1331(a) could have been satisfied, the eleventh amend-
ment1 59 would have precluded retrospective relief,16 0 the net result
was the existence of a significant body of federal claims for which
no clear base of federal jurisdiction existed,"1 thus rendering ac-
that the surviving jurisdictional component of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), did not provide for jurisdiction over supremacy clause claims based on
the Social Security Act. The Court in Chapman reasoned that the Social Security Act was
not a law providing for equal rights within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and that §
1983, as a passive conduit, could not qualify as such a law. However, in Maine v. Thiboutot,
100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980), the Court ruled that § 1983 was intended to provide a cause of action
for state and local refusal to abide by federal statutory law. Some tension would appear to
exist between the Chapman view of § 1983 as a passive conduit and the Thiboutot view of §
1983 as a dynamic creator of rights. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. at 2509-11 (Powell,
J., dissenting); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. at 31-40 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
156. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
157. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
158. E.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.
332 (1969).
159. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
160. See generally Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edelnan v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974). As with the jurisdictional amount, the very existence of the eleventh amendment
appears to contemplate state jurisdiction over clanns which are jurisdictionally barred from
federal court.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), supports the argument that states ceded
sovereign immunity against federal claims as a necessary concomitant of joining the Union,
subject only to the eleventh amendment's bar on suits in federal court. Pursuant to such a
theory, states would be freely suable on federal causes of action in state courts, regardless of
whether they had waived sovereign immunity for state-law-based claims. Since Chisholm
was a diversity case, the sovereign immunity of states as against federal claims in state court
has not been tested.
161. If a welfare case raises both statutory and constitutional issues, however, clear fed-
eral jurisdiction over the constitutional claim is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), while
pendent jurisdiction authorizes consideration of the statutory claim. Indeed, the pendent
statutory claim should be decided before reaching the constitutional claim and may be de-
cided even after the constitutional claim has been mooted. E.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
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cess to state courts a necessity.162
In 1980, Congress eliminated the jurisdictional amount,16 3
thereby recognizing the responsibility of federal courts to decide
federal law regardless of the amount in controversy 164 Nonethe-
less, Congress allowed a specific exemption for cases brought
against defendants other than the United States under section
23(a) of the Consumer Product Safety Act. i6 5 This exemption indi-
cates the continued reliance on state courts by the Congress to de-
cide federal law.
Finally, our only historical brush with a regime of permissive
state jurisdiction over federal claims supports the view that such
jurisdiction should not be left to the decision of local majorities.
Acting on the hints contained in the opinions of Justice Story and
Justice McLean in Prgg v. Pennsylvania,6 abolitionists in Massa-
chusetts and Pennsylvania succeeded in closing their courts to at-
tempts to enforce fugitive slave rights under the 1793 Act.1 7 While
528 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
162. Welfare cases were not the only example of important federal rights falling within
exclusive state court jurisdiction. Any claim premised on the pre-1980 version of 28 U.S.C. §
1331(a) which failed to satisfy the jurisdictional amount faced similar problems.
163. The 1980 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 reads: "The district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
486, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369.
164. H.R. REP. No. 1461, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). The amendment was meant to
resolve "the anomolous [sic] situation faced by persons who, although their federal rights
have been violated, are barred from a Federal forum solely because they have not suffered a
sufficient economic injury." Id. See also S. REP. No. 827, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980)
("Federal courts should bear the responsibility of deciding Federal law").
165. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 3, 94
Stat. 2369 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a)).
Congress explained that the exception was needed as the Consumer Product Safety Act
was passed with a specific tie-r to the jurisdictional amount. S. REP. No. 827, 96th Cong.,
2d Seas. 2 (1980).
166. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); see notes 118-122 supra.
167. See generally T. MoIs, Fan MEN ALL (1974); id. at 114 (Massachusetts Personal
Liberty Law of 1843); id. at 118 (Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law of 1847); id. at 119-23
(failure of New York to enact similar legislation). See also R. COVER, supra note 120.
The strategy failed when Congress established a corps of federal slave commissioners as
part of the Compromise of 1850, rendering resort to state courts unnecessary. Abolitionists
promptly attacked the slave commissioners by seeking state habeas corpus writs designed to
shift the cases back to state courts in sympathy with the fugitive. The strategy failed in In
re Booth, 3 Wis. 13 (1854), rev'd sub nom. Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
See generally R. CovR, supra note 120; T. MoIs, supra, at 186-201.
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one hopes that we will never again be called upon to enforce fed-
eral rights which are so morally repugnant as those flowing from
the fugitive slave clause, it is the nature of certain federal rights to
be controversial. Often a federal right reflects a utilitarian judg-
ment that the greater good requires favoring one geographical sec-
tion or one economic group over another. While such a utilitarian
judgment may seem obvious in Washington, D.C., it may not ap-
pear so obvious in areas under the political sway of the disfavored
group. Moreover, many federal rights, especially constitutional
rights, may be opposed by a majority everywhere. The bruising po-
litical battles associated with closing state courts to such unpopu-
lar federal rights, even assuming the existence of alternative fed-
eral enforcement machinery, 16 8 and the bitterness and sense of
betrayal which closing the state courts would create in the benefi-
ciaries of the rights argue strongly for a presumptively obligatory
state responsibility to enforce all federal rights. This responsibility
is subject, of course, to a congressional decision to vest exclusive
enforcement responsibilities in the federal judiciary.
This suggested formulation differs from the current antidis-
crinmation model of Mondou and Testa in two ways. First, it
would not permit a state to avoid enforcing a federal claim by im-
posing similar disabilities on persons asserting state claims. While
a state may be free to deny access to its courts to persons asserting
state law claims, the constitutional scheme imposes an affirmative
responsibility on states-at least as long as they operate courts-to
provide judicial machinery to enforce federal rights. Where Con-
gress has prescribed liberal, if possibly misguided, venue rules in
connection with the enforcement of federal rights, state courts
should not ignore them merely because they apply similar disabili-
ties to persons asserting state law claims.16 9 Of course, in the ab-
sence of explicit congressional definition of venue or other similar
rules, states remain free to treat federal claims identically with
state claims for the purposes of venue and territorial jurisdiction.
Second, this formulation would prevent Congress from removing
168. As I have suggested, no guaranty of the existence of adequate enforcement maclnm-
ery exists. See notes 154-165 & accompanying text supra.
169. Thus, I believe that Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929), and
Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950), were wrongly decided. See
notes 130-142 & accompanying text supra.
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the jurisdiction of the state courts over federal claims unless ade-
quate alternative federal enforcement machinery were in existence.
Because, given the vulnerability of federal courts, state courts are
vested with an important residual responsibility to provide a
mechanism to exercise judicial review, Congress may not interfere
with that responsibility unless alternative judicial forums capable
of exercising judicial review exist.170 Thus, even were the worst to
occur, that is, were Congress to abolish the federal courts,"" state
courts would remain as a last bastion of judicial review.72 In any
event, whether one adopts the antidiscrimination rationale of
Mondou and Testa or the suggestion of an affirmative duty, once
state courts are deemed bound to entertain a federal cause of ac-
tion, they must decide what, if any, collateral federal rules must be
applied m connection with the adjudication of the federal claim.
TRADITIONAL CROSS-FORUM APPLICABILITY OF COLLATERAL RULES
Whenever a cause of action generated in one jurisdiction is en-
forced in the courts of another, the question arises whether collat-
eral rules of the generative jurisdiction should or must be imported
170. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (statutory remedy does not oust constitu-
tionally based claim unless it provides equivalent and effective protection). See generally
Comment, Carlson v. Green: The Inference of a Constitutional Cause of Action Despite the
Availability of a Federal Tort Claims Act Remedy, 22 WM. & MARY L. RpV. 559 (1981).
171. I do not suggest that such an eventuality is even remotely likely. As the Hart dia-
logue demonstrates, however, one can gain a better understanding of our present institu-
tional structure by rotating it through a series of purely hypothetical extremes. See HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 330-60.
172. If state courts are to perform as residual review organs, some rethinking of Abelman
v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859), and Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. 397 (1872), is necessary.
Traditional analysis prohibits state courts from entering equitable relief against federal offi-
cials, but permits the entry of damage awards against federal wrongdoers. E.g., Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 391 nA (1971). As long as an effective alternative
federal forum exists, the prohibition on injunctions is innocuous enough, although the re-
moval statutes would appear to provide sufficient protection against abuse of state equitable
power. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969); 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1976). However,
the vulnerability of federal jurisdiction argues against a blanket prohibition on state equita-
ble relief. Removal, stay practice, and ultimate Supreme Court review are sufficient to pro-
tect against abuse of state injunctive review of federal actions during normal periods. If, on
the other hand, there is no federal court to remove to because its jurisdiction has been
abolished, or if the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction has been taken away, residual
state review power over federal officials is a necessity if judicial review is to occur at all.
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by the forum. 173 The question arises in three contexts, keyed to the
degree of deference which the forum jurisdiction must display to
the generative jurisdiction's policy judgment. When the degree of
deference is relatively weak, as in a garden-variety conflicts of law
setting, the choice of whether to import the generative jurisdic-
tion's collateral rule is essentially discretionary, drawing on notions
of comity.17 ' When the degree of deference is considerably
stronger, as when one state is obliged to give full faith and credit
173. By "generative jurisdiction," I mean the political entity which made the policy judg-
ment that a given set of facts should give rise to enforceable legal consequences. By "forum
jurisdiction," I mean the political entity which is asked to provide the enforcement machin-
ery for the policy judgment. Obviously, the generative and forum jurisdictions are often
identical. Even when they are identical, it may be necessary for the forum to decide whether
to borrow certain collateral rules from some other source of law or to generate its own collat-
eral rules. E.g., Board of Regents v. Tomamo, 446 U.S. 478 (1980); Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14 (1980); Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979); United States v. Kim-
bell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Chevron Oil Corp. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97
(1971); Industrial Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-04 (1966); Lev-
mson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914); Chattanooga Foun-
dry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); Bomar v.
Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1947); Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d
543, 546-47 (8th Cir. 1945), aff'd mem., 327 U.S. 757 (1946). I suggest that the same prnci-
ple should govern both the question of whether to import and whether to borrow a collateral
rule. See notes 235-250 & accompanying text snfra. See generally Hill, State Procedural
Law zn Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HAIRv. L. Rv. 66 (1955).
By "collateral rules," I mean a host of issues which must be faced whenever a legal rule is
judicially enforced, including the nature and availability of defenses or immunities, the
identity of potential plaintiffs, the survivorship of the cause of action, the applicable limita-
tions period, rules governing the assessment and computation of damages, rules governing
the availability and scope of equitable relief, rules governing the form, timing, and suffi-
ciency of the pleadings, rules governing the burden of proof, rules governing the availability
and administration of jury trials, rules governing the allocation of functions between judge,
jury, and alternative methods of fact-finding, rules governing discovery, rules governing the
admissibility of evidence, rules governing the geographical setting of the trial, and rules
governing the form and consequences of service of process. Many collateral rules fall within
traditional notions of procedure. However, given the tendency to label a rule as either "pro-
cedural" or "substantive" without thinking about whether it should or should not be im-
ported or borrowed, it seems vse to use a more neutral term--"collateral."
174. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); see Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451
(1904). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 133 (1971) (persuasion
burden); id. § 134 (production burden); id. § 134 (presumptions); id. § 135 (sufficiency of
evidence); td. § 129 (mode of trial); id. § 138 (evidence); td. § 139 (privileges); td. §§ 142-143
(statutes of limitations); see also DE CEVERA, TH STATUTE OF LrnATiONS IN AMRiCAN
CONFLICTS OF LAW (1966).
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to the judgments of another, the obligation of the forum jurisdic-
tion to apply certain collateral rules of the generative jurisdiction
is correspondingly mcreased.175 When, however, the forum juris-
diction is constitutionally compelled to defer totally to the policy
judgments of the generative jurisdiction, the problem is most acute
because the forum must refrain from enforcing collateral rules
which trench on the policymakmg prerogatives of the generative
jurisdiction. Under our system, such a maximum-deference level
can occur in two settings.
First, state courts may be asked to enforce federal policy judg-
ments to which they must give maximum deference under the
supremacy clause.176 State judicial enforcement of federal rights,
while not an everyday phenomenon, is firmly rooted in history"
and current practice under which state courts routinely enforce
federal rights under the FELA, 7 8 the Jones Act,179 section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act,8 0 and the Civil Rights
Acts. i8 l
175. See, e.g., Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928) (state cannot refuse to enforce
judgment on grounds the action was barred by its statutes of limitations when the judgment
was rendered); Holbein v. Rigot, 245 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1971) (foreign judgment for punitive
damages entitled to full faith and credit); Ferster v. Ferster, 220 Ga. 319, 138 S.E.2d 674
(1964) (foreign judgment enforced despite pendency of review in generative forum). None-
theless, the full faith and credit clause limits state choice of law only if it threatens the
federal interest in national unity. See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 49 U.S.L:W 4071
(1981).
176. For a discussion of the obligation of state courts to act as federal enforcement fo-
rums, see notes 145-172 & accompanying text supra.
177. The second Congress to convene under the Constitution vested significant enforce-
ment responsibilities in the state courts. E.g., Act of Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (fugitive slave
enforcement). See generally Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). State courts
have played substantial roles in enforcing federal policy. E.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386
(1947) (Emergency Price Control Act); Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178 (1944) (Emergency
Price Control Act); Pufahl v. Parks, 299 U.S. 217 (1936) (Emergency Price Control Act);
United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463 (1936) (claims to Russian
assets after recognition of Soviet government); Seabury v. Green, 294 U.S. 165 (1935) (na-
tional bank share assessments); Forrest v. Jack, 294 U.S. 158 (1935) (national bank share
assessments); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876) (bankruptcy-related litigation). See
generally Redish & Muench, supra note 91; Note, supra note 91.
178. E.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Brown v. Western Ry. 338 U.S.
294 (1949); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
179. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) (construing predecessor to 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1976)).
180. Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
181. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 statutory claim); Marti-
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Conversely, federal courts may be asked, pursuant to diversity""2
or pendent1 85 jurisdiction, to enforce policy judgments that, under
the Constitution, are the sole province of the states.' In both sit-
uations the forum jurisdiction is constitutionally forbidden to in-
terfere with the generative activities of its federal partner. In de-
termining the appropriate collateral rules to govern such cross-
forum enforcement, we have sought, under a variety of rubrics, to
determine whether substituting the forum partner's collateral rule
for the collateral rule of the generative partner would be likely to
exert a substantial impact on behavior which the generative forum
hoped to modify in establishing the cause of action in the first
place. If either the preincident behavior of the targets of the cause
of action or the postincident ability of the beneficiaries of the
cause of action to enjoy it would be substantially modified by a
nez v. California, 100 S. Ct. 553 (42 U.S.C. § 1983); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229 (1969) (42 U.S.C. § 1983).
182. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
183. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
184. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
There is substantial disagreement as to the precise underpinnings of Erie. Professor Ely
has argued that Erie rests solely on a reinterpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693, 704 (1974).
He argues that attempts to develop a constitutional structure underlying Erie are needlessly
confusing since the Rules of Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1976), cover the field. Ely, supra, at 698. According to Professor Ely, when Congress actu-
ally enacts legislation which arguably intrudes on reserved state power, there will be time
enough to worry about constitutional theory. Id. at 706-07 & n.77.
Justice Harlan, on the other hand, viewed Erie in broader terms as seeking to distill prin-
ciples of federalism which govern the relationship of federal power to reserved state rights.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
While Professor Ely's reminder that Erie issues involve statutory construction as well as
abstract federalism analysis is an important warning and aids in resolving many cases, it
does not avoid the necessity of positing a constitutional underpinning. As Professor Chayes
has noted, even Ely's formidable analytic powers cannot avoid disputes over the resolution
of particular issues. Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HAv. L. REv. 741 (1974); Ely, The Neck-
lace, 87 HARv. L. REv. 753 (1974). The resolution of such disputes should depend on a pur-
posive interpretation of Erie which, at bottom, will be constitutionally based. But see
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 100 S. Ct. 1978 (1980). More importantly, the Ely formulation
merely defers the constitutional issue since one must still decide whether the Rules Ena-
bling Act authorizes certain activity on the basis of whether it is procedural or substantive.
Only a purposive, constitutionally based interpretation of Erie can guide such a choice. In
any event, I take Justice Brandeis at his word that he would not have overturned one hun-
dred years of statutory construction of the Rules of Decisions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976),
in the absence of constitutional considerations. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 77-78.
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failure to apply the generative jurisdiction's collateral rule, we have
labelled the collateral rule "integral to the cause of action" 18 5 or
"substantive1 6 and have required the forum to apply it m order
to avoid diluting the impact of the generative jurisdiction's policy
choice. When, however, application of the forum's collateral rule
would not be likely to modify the impact of the generative jurisdic-
tion's policy choice, we have labelled it merely "procedural" and
have permitted the forum to apply its own rule.
Federal Rights Enforced rn State Courts
In the years following Mondou v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad,18 7 the Supreme Court was called upon to antic-
ipate its post-Erne role and to define the collateral rules applicable
to federally based actions, generally involving the FELA, brought
in state court. Four celebrated cases set out the basic principles.
In Davis v. Wechsler,"8 when a state pleading rule would have
negated a federal venue right, Justice Holmes stated: "Whatever
sprmges the state may set for those who are endeavoring to assert
rights that the State confers, the assertion of federal rights, when
plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name
of local practice."""9 In Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co.,190 Jus-
tice Black ruled that the right of a Jones Act plaintiff "to be free
from the burden of proof imposed by the Pennsylvania local rule
inhered in his [federal] cause of action."'91
185. Cases considering whether to require a state court to enforce a federal collateral rule
often ask whether it is an "integral" part of the federal cause of action. E.g., Dice v. Akron,
C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949); Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
186. The distinction between substance and procedure in the context of Erie has passed
into legend.
187. 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
188. 263 U.S. 22 (1923).
189. Id. at 24.
190. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
191. Id. at 245. Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Garrett is one of the few which
recognize the essential similarity of the state and federal cross-forum issues.
It must be remembered that the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with the federal courts to try actions under the Merchant Marine
Act. The source of the governing law applied is in the national, not the
state, government. If by its practice the state court were permitted substan-
tially to alter the rights of either litigant, as those rights were established in
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In Brown v. Western Railway,192 the Court, quoting Davis, held
that "[s]trict local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose un-
necessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal
laws."1 93 Finally, in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Rail-
road,'" the Court ruled that an FELA plaintiff was entitled to a
jury trial in state court, despite a contrary local rule, because the
jury trial was an integral part of his FELA cause of action. Davis,
Garrett, Brown, and Dice are merely well-known examples of nu-
merous Supreme Court cases dealing with the obligation of state
courts to apply federal collateral rules when the premcident or
postincident integrity of the federal cause of action is threatened.
Thus, when federal rights are enforced in state courts, in determin-
ing the applicable collateral rules governing pleading, federal (gen-
erative) standards govern the sufficiency of the pleading,'9 5 as well
federal law, the remedy afforded by the State would not enforce, but would
actually deny, federal rights which Congress, by providing alternative reme-
dies, intended to make not less but more secure. The constant objective of
legislation and jurisprudence is to assure litigants full protection for all sub-
stantive rights intended to be afforded them by the jurisdiction in which the
right itself originates. Not so long ago we sought to achieve this result with
respect to the enforcement in the federal courts of rights created or governed
by state law [citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins]. So here, in trying this case
the state court was bound to proceed in such manner that all the substantial
rights of the parties under controlling federal law would be protected.
Id. at 245 (footnotes omitted).
192. 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
193. Id. at 298-99.
194. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
195. Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923).
In Brown, a Georgia pleading rule required plaintiff's pleading to be harshly construed
against him. Plaintiff merely alleged injury from tripping over "clinkers" in the roadbed,
without specifying negligence on the railroad's part in connection with the debris. Under
principles of notice pleading prevailing in federal court, the allegations would have clearly
been sufficient. The Court applied the federal standard and overturned a dismissal of the
complaint. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson dissented, stating, "It is not a denial of a Fed-
eral right for Georgia to reflect something of the pernicketiness with which seventeenth-
century common law read a pleading." 338 U.S. at 303.
Davis grew out of an action involving railroads under federal control during World War I.
Federal regulations required such suits to be brought in the state of the plaintiff's residence
or where the cause of action arose. Plaintiff's state court action satisfied neither federal
venue requirement. State pleading practice, however, deemed venue objections waived by
the filing of an answer which responded to the merits as well as objecting to venue. Justice
Holmes ruled that state pleading practice with respect to venue could not defeat the asser-
tion of the federal right. 263 U.S. at 23-25.
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as the form of action pleaded,""8 but state (forum) standards gov-
ern the tune limits, 97 amendment process,"" and appellate
practice.'
Similarly, in choosing the applicable collateral rules governing
the fact-finding process, federal (generative) rules govern the avail-
ability20 0 and administration 20 ' of a jury trial, including the suffi-
196. American Ry. Express Co. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19 (1923). In Levee, plaintiff sued for
the value of a lost trunk, in apparent violation of the Interstate Commerce Commission
limitation of liability rules. Louisiana courts ruled that the limitation of liability would not
apply unless the loss were accidental or uncontrollable. Since plaintiff sued in trover, the
burden under Louisiana law was on the defendant to demonstrate that its refusal to deliver
the trunk was justifiable. The Supreme Court reversed, saying: "The law of the United
States cannot be evaded by the forms of local practice. The local rule applied as to
burden of proof narrowed the protection that the defendant had secured, and therefore con-
travened the law." Id. at 21.
197. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Mims, 242 U.S. 532 (1917). In Mims, plaintiff had failed
to allege a violation of the FELA, and was precluded from seeking to prove one. The Court
upheld the refusal, stating:
While it is true that a substantive federal right or defense duly asserted can-
not be lessened or destroyed by a state rule of practice, yet the claim of the
[appellant] to a federal right not having been asserted at a time and in a man-
ner calling for the consideration of it by the state Supreme Court under its
established system of practice and pleading, the refusal of the trial court and
of the Supreme Court to admit testimony tendered in support of such claim is
not a denial of a federal right
Id. at 536.
198. Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915). In Central Vermont, the Vermont
Supreme Court permitted a plaintiff to amend his pleading to conform to proof and, thus, to
make out an FELA claim. As in Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Mims, 242 U.S. 532 (1917), the
Supreme Court ruled that state rules on amendment and timing of pleadings did not im-
pinge on the federal right. The Court in Central Vermont held, however, that federal rules
on sufficiency of the evidence and burden of proof must govern. Id. at 511-12. Central Ver-
mont is, thus, among the first cases to differentiate between collateral rules which affect the
generative jurisdiction's policy judgment and collateral rules which do not. The dichotomy
recognized by the Court in Central Vermont has dominated cross-forum enforcement cases
ever since.
199. John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583 (1913).
200. Squire v. Wheeling & L.E.R.R., 342 U.S. 935 (1952) (per curiam); Dice v. Akron C. &
Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952). In Dice, the Supreme Court required Ohio state courts to pro-
vide jury trials in FELA cases despite a contrary local rule. Dice purports to rest on a con-
struction of the intent of Congress in enacting the FELA. Id. at 363.
201. Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F Ry., 353 U.S. 360 (1957) (per curiam); Norfolk S.R.R. v.
Ferebee, 238 U.S. 269 (1915).
In Ferebee, the Court ruled that the right of a defendant under the FELA to a reduction
in damages proportionate to the degree of the plaintiff's contributory negligence would ordi-
narily be violated by a local rule providing for separate trials on the issues of liability and
damages. Id. at 273. In Arnold, the Court held that Texas rules on the relationship between
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ciency of the evidence needed to sustain a verdict and the propri-
ety of directing a verdict.2 02 State (forum) rules, however, govern
the effect of nonunanimous verdicts. 203 Federal (generative) rules
govern the size and allocation of the burden of proof,20' but state
(forum) rules probably govern the admissibility of evidence and
the availability of discovery.205
The pleading cases and the cases dealing with the collateral rules
governing fact-finding seem to draw a pragmatic distinction be-
tween those rules likely to affect the distribution of economic costs
and benefits established by the generative forum, and those rules
which, while significant in a given case, are not likely to alter the
general allocation of risks. And while one can quibble with an occa-
sional application of the principle, by and large the cases faithfully
maintain the congressional policy judgments which led to the en-
general and special verdicts could not defeat the recovery of an FELA plaintiff who had
received a favorable general verdict. 353 U.S. at 361.
202. Among the numerous Supreme Court cases holding that federal standards govern the
sufficiency of the evidence are: Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949); Brady v. South-
ern Ry., 320 U.S. 476 (1943); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Stapleton, 279 U.S. 587 (1929); West-
ern & A.R.R. v. Hughes, 278 U.S. 496 (1929); Toledo, St. L. & W.R.R. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165
(1928); Chicago, M. & St. P Ry. v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472 (1926); and Central Vt. Ry. v.
White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
203. Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916). In Bombolis, the Court
sustained a nonunammous verdict for the plaintiff in a state FELA case. Bombolis thus
anticipated by a half-century the current Supreme Court's perception that unanimity is not
integral to the conception of a jury verdict, even in criminal cases. See Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding verdict rendered by 10 of 12 jurors); Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356 (1972) (upholding verdict rendered by 9 of 12 jurors). But see Burch v. Lousi-
ana, 441 U.S. 120 (1979) (invalidating verdict of 5 of 6 jurors). See also Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223 (1978) (invalidating five person jury). Thus no conflict exists between Dice,
which requires a state to use juries in FELA cases, and Bombolis, which permits the juries
to act nonunanmously. See also Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Carnahan, 241 U.S. 241 (1916)
(upholding seven person juries in FELA cases).
204. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); American Ry. Express Co. v.
Levee, 263 U.S. 19 (1923); New Orleans & N.E.R.R. v. Harris, 247 U.S. 367 (1918); New
York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917); Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507
(1915).
205. The Supreme Court has not spoken explicitly on the rules governing discovery and
the admissibility of evidence in state courts enforcing federal claims. In Central Vt. Ry. v.
White, the Court suggested that state rules would govern. 238 U.S. 507, 511 (1915). The
Supreme Court has twice upheld the applicability of forum discovery rules in diversity
cases. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1
(1941). See generally C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTI cE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
§ 5135 (1977).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:725
actment of the legislation in question, even to drawing fine distinc-
tions between jury trials and nonunanimous verdicts.0 6
The concern for maintaining the integrity of the generative fo-
rum's policy decision as to risk allocation and behavior modifica-
tion is equally apparent in the cases choosing collateral rules gov-
erning the scope of a defendant's liability. 0 7 Thus, federal
(generative) rules govern the availability and computation of dam-
ages, 20 as well as the existence of immunities and defenses.209
Moreover, because the limitations period is intimately connected
both to the allocation of economic risks and the degree of behavior
modification, federal (generative) rules have been held to govern
its length,210 related accrual," and commencement issues.21 2 Fi-
206. Compare Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), with Dice v.
Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
207. See generally Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401 (1977); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Erie R.R. v. Winfield, 224 U.S. 170 (1917J; New York Cent.
R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492 (1914).
208. E.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916); Chicago, R.I. & P Ry. v. Devine, 239 U.S. 52 (1915); Michigan
Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913). See also Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Ben-
nett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931); Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); General Oil Co. v.
Cram, 209 U.S. 105 (1908).
The most dramatic insistence on federal damage rules occurred in Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916), where the Court required state juries to discount the present
value of future receipts in awarding FELA verdicts. The means of proving the appropriate
discount was left to state discretion. Id. at 491.
209. E.g., Martinez v. Califorma, 100 S. Ct. 553 (1980); Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry., 365
U.S. 160 (1961); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939); Beadle v. Spencer,
298 U.S. 124 (1936); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936); Chicago, R.I. & P Ry. v.
Wright, 239 U.S. 548 (1916); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492 (1914).
210. International Union v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 n.4 (1966); Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199 (1915); El Paso & N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S.
87 (1909). See also McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
In McAllister, the most dramatic example of federal inposition of a limitation period, a
plamtiff had brought a federal claim in state court, linking it with a related state claim. The
Court ruled that since both the state and federal clais would most likely be asserted in a
single proceeding, the state court must apply the federal period to the state claim in order
to provide the plaintiff the full benefit of the federal right. Id. at 226.
211. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Rankin v. Barton, 199 U.S. 228 (1905).
212. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U.S. 77 (1945). In Herb v.
Pitcazrn, Illinois courts had held that an FELA claim was not commenced for the purposes
of tolling the limitations period by filing it in a state court which lacked jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the commencement issue was governed by federal law
and that filing an FELA clain in the wrong state court commenced it for limitations pur-
poses. Id. at 78. Compare Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
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nally, federal (generative) rules govern the definition of the class of
eligible plaintiffs,21 8 including the survivorslp of claims by per-
sons whose death is related to the federal cause of action.21'
When, however, the state (forum) collateral rule is not likely to
interfere with the federal (generative) jurisdiction's judgment as to
risk allocation and behavior modification, the Supreme Court has
permitted the state to apply its collateral rules to the litigation of
federal claims. Thus, in addition to the tining215 and amend-
ment21e of pleadings, the control of appellate practice,21 7 and the
use of nonunanimous juries,21 8 state (forum) rules govern the form
and territorial reach of service219 and door-closing rules associated
with venue and forum non conventens.220
(1949) (filing of complaint with federal court did not toll state statute of limitations), with
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 100 S. Ct. 1978 (1980) (filing of complaint with subsequent
service deemed to toll state statute of limitations).
213. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); New York Cent. &
H.R.R. v. Tonsellito, 244 U.S. 360 (1917).
214. Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913). Vreeland dealt with a plaintiff
who died as a result of the injury underlying the FELA suit. Compare Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978), with Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
215. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Mims, 242 U.S. 532 (1917).
216. Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
217. John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583 (1913).
218. Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
219. Missouri ex rel. St. L., B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924). In Taylor, the
Court upheld the use of quasi in rem service by a state court in an FELA action despite the
inability of a federal court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction. See also Mississippi Pub.
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
220. Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); Douglas v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). The door-closing rules may not be discrimmatorily
applied to federal, but not to state, causes of action. McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F Ry., 292
U.S. 230 (1934).
A distinction may exist between door-closing rules designed to advance a policy of the
generative forum and door-closing rules which do not appear linked to the generative juris-
diction's underlying policy judgment. Compare Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923) (ap-
plying federal door-closing venue rules to displace state rules), with Douglas v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929) (applying federal door-closing venue rules to displace
state rules), and Missouri ex reL Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950) (applying state
door-closing rules to displace federal rules). See also Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 315 U.S.
698 (1942) (state court cannot enjoin prosecution of an FELA claim in another state's courts
on mconvemence grounds). A similar distinction may exist when federal courts enforce state
rights. Compare Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (state door-closing
statute applicable to federal court when foreign corporation seeks to sue without a regis-
tered agent), with Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965) (state door-
closing statute inapplicable to federal court in wrongful death action).
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State Rights Enforced in Federal Court
In the years following Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,ss1 the Su-
preme Court was called upon to replicate its experience with fed-
eral claims in state court in the context of state rights enforced in
federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. Happily, a marked
parallelism exists between the two efforts. In a diversity context, as
in the earlier cases following Mondou, the Supreme Court appears
to require the forum jurisdiction to enforce those collateral rules of
the generative jurisdiction which substantially affect the risk allo-
cation and behavior modification of the cause of action in question.
Thus, defenses and immunities22 are governed by state (genera-
tive) law, as is the definition of eligible plaintiffs.223 Moreover, bur-
den of proof rules,22 4 as well as policy-related rules governing the
fact-finding process,125 are governed by state (generative) law.
However, rules specifying the identity of the fact-finder that do
not appear to have been designed by the generative jurisdiction to
affect the allocation of risks need not be applied by the federal
forum.22
e
221. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
222. Miree v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 433 U.S. 25 (1977) (immunity); Palmer v. Hoff-
man, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) (defenses). The parallel citations governing federal rights in state
court are collected at note 209 supra.
223. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Cohen, the Court
upheld a New Jersey rule requiring plaintiffs in a shareholder's derivative action to post an
expensive security bond, despite the lack of such a requirement in Rule 23 of the federal
rules. Justice Harlan may well have developed his views of Erie as counsel for the successful
corporate defendants in Cohen. The parallel federal right/state court citation is New York
Cent. & H.R.R. v. Tonsellito, 244 U.S. 360 (1917).
224. Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap,
308 U.S. 208 (1939). Parallel federal right/state court citations are collected at note 204
supra.
225. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). In Bernhardt, the Court held that
the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply to diversity litigation, permitting state rules to
govern the identity of the fact-finder. Bernhardt is, thus, consistent with cases such as Dice
v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952), which apply generative collateral rules to estab-
lish the identity of the fact-finder. But see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356
U.S. 525 (1958).
226. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). In Byrd, the Court
applied federal jury trial rules to a South Carolina diversity case which would not have
received a jury trial in state court. The Court sought to distinguish Dice by arguing that
Congress, in establishing the FELA, had factored the element of jury trial into its allocation
of risks and benefits. Thus, a failure to provide a jury to an FELA plaintiff would result in
an improper alteration by the forum of the balance struck by the generative jurisdiction.
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As with the post-Mondou federal right/state court cases, issues
surrounding the length of the limitations period,227 including ac-
crual228 and commencement,229 are governed by state (generative)
law. Finally, door-closing rules that are designed to enforce a pol-
icy judgment within the competence of the generative jurisdiction
must be enforced by the forum.2 30 However, door-closing devices
that are unrelated to the advancement of a generative jurisdiction
policy need not be automatically applied by the forum.2 31
Conversely, where the forum rule is not likely to alter the behav-
ior of the targets of the generative jurisdiction's policy judgment or
change the balance of risks and advantages established by the gen-
erative jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has upheld the federal (fo-
rum) rule in diversity cases, just as it upheld the state (forum) rule
in cases enforcing federal rights in state court. Thus, federal (fo-
rum) rules govern the geographical reach of the court 23 2 and the
mode of service, 233 as well as the scope of discovery.234
The Court claimed to find no such relationship between the South Carolina jury trial rule
and the general allocation of risks and benefits established by the South Carolina cause of
action at issue.
If the Court was right, Byrd is analogous to cases such as Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), which apply forum rules to the fact-finding process so long as
they do not alter the generative jurisdiction's policy judgment. See note 203 supra. If the
Court was wrong about why South Carolina decided not to have a jury, Byrd was wrongly
decided, for, unless the seventh amendment forbids South Carolina from dispensing with a
jury, its judgment as to the identity of the fact-finder is as worthy of respect as is Congress'
in the context of the FELA.
227. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Parallel federal right/state court
cases are collected at notes 210-212 supra.
228. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940). The parallel federal right/
state court citation is to Rankm v. Barton, 199 U.S. 229 (1905).
229. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 100 S. Ct 1978 (1980); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). The parallel federal right/state court citation is to Herb
v. Pitcairn, 325 U.S. 77 (1945).
230. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). The most analogous parallel
federal right/state court citation is Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923). See also Miles v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 315 U.S. 698 (1942).
231. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965). The most analogous
parallel federal right/state court citations are to Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279
U.S. 377 (1929), and Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
232. Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). Murphree sustained the
use of Rule 4() in diversity cases. The parallel federal right/state court citation is to Mis-
souri ex rel. St. L., B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924) (upholding state quasi in rem
jurisdiction m FELA cases).
233. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). An analogous federal right/state court citation
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Absence of Federal Collateral Rule
A third body of precedent, functionally related to the federal
right-state court and post-Erie cases, involves the enforcement of
federal rights m the absence of an existing federal collateral rule.
In such cases, the forum jurisdiction-usually, but not always, a
federal court 2 5-must decide whether to borrow a governing col-
lateral rule from some other source of law-usually the state m
which it sits-or to generate an independent federal collateral
rule.2 8 In deciding whether to borrow an existing state collateral
rule or to generate a new one, courts must decide whether the state
collateral rule would adversely affect the policy judgments underly-
ing the federal cause of action.237 Thus, in Republic Pictures Corp.
v. Kappler,285 the Supreme Court declined to borrow a state limi-
tations period which was too short to accommodate the federal pol-
icies underlying the federal statutory cause of action, and, m Carl-
is Missouri ex rel. St. L., B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924).
234. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1
(1941). Surprisingly, given the broader discovery generally available under federal practice, I
have been unable to discover a Supreme Court case in which a plaintiff asserting federal
rights in state court sought to use federal discovery rules. Unfortunately, neither Sibbach
nor Schlagenhauf attempts a serious analysis of the factors which should guide a forum
court in deciding whether to apply generative or forum discovery rules. See Ely, The Irre-
pressible Myth of Erie, supra note 184.
235. See generally cases cited note 173 supra.
236. See generally Hill, supra note 173.
237. E.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14 (1980); Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471
(1979); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Robertson v. Wegmann,
436 U.S. 584 (1978); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); International
Union v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-04 (1966); Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S.
648 (1953); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392
(1946); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S.
390 (1906); Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); Republic Pictures Corp. v.
Kappler, 151 F.2d 543, 546-47 (8th Cir. 1945), aff'd mem., 327 U.S. 757 (1946).
238. 151 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1945), aff'd mem., 327 U.S. 757 (1946). Republic Pictures
involved the refusal of an Iowa district court to borrow a six month Iowa limitation period
applicable to all federal causes of action. Since the per curiam affirmance cited McKnett v.
St. Louis & S.F Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934), it was probably based on the antidiscrimination
principle discussed at notes 117-144 supra. However, in International Union v. Hoosier Car-
dinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707 n.9 (1966), the Court suggested that unduly short limitations
periods would raise serious problems, even if applied equally to state and federal claims. See
also Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 615 (1895).
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son v. Green,239 the Court declined to borrow a state survivorship
rule at variance with the policies underlying a cause of action pre-
mised on the Federal Constitution.
In Carlson, a state survivorship rule would have barred an action
for damages premised on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents.240 The Supreme Court declined to borrow the state survi-
vorship rule in cases where the plaintiff's death resulted from the
defendant's acts.4 1 However, in Robertson v. Wegmann,242 the
Court borrowed a state survivorship rule to block a section 1983
claim where the plaintiff's death was unrelated to the cause of ac-
tion, reasoning that such a rule would have negligible impact on
the policies underlying section 1983. Similarly, in Board of Regents
v. Tomanto, 243 the Court declined to permit the Second Circuit to
generate a federal tolling rule designed to encourage potential sec-
tion 1983 plaintiffs to exhaust state judicial remedies, reasoning
that, because New York's failure to provide such a toll did not ad-
versely impact on the policies underlying section 1983, no reason
existed to decline to borrow the applicable state limitations pe-
riod.244 The reasoning underlying Carlson, Wegmann, and
Tomanto parallels Justice Harlan's concurrence in Hanna v.
Plumer,245 and the Court's reasoning in Davis v. Wechsler,24 Gar-
rett v. Moore-McCormack,47 Brown v. Western Railway,248 and
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad.249 The confluence
of the three lines of authority'50 suggests the following general rule
governing the choice of collateral rules in a cross-forum setting:
whenever the generative jurisdiction enjoys constitutional primacy
239. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
240. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
241. The parallel federal right/state court citation is Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227
U.S. 59 (1913).
242. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
243. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
244. Id. at 488.
245. 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
246. 263 U.S. 22 (1923).
247. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
248. 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
249. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
250. Similar issues will also arise when the Supreme Court determines whether a decision
rests on adequate state grounds. 16 C. WRIGHT, A. Mluan, E. COOPER & E. GREssmAN, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION §§ 4019-4032 (1977 & Supp. 1981).
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in a given area of lawmaking, the forum jurisdiction must apply
the collateral rule of the generative jurisdiction if it is likely to ex-
ert a substantial impact on the preincident behavior of the targets
of the cause of action or if it is likely to affect the ability of the
beneficiaries of the cause of action to enjoy its full benefit.
TOWARD PROCEDURAL PARITY: CROSS-FORUM COLLATERAL RULES IN
SECTION 1983 ACTIONS IN STATE COURTS
Thus, if the application of a collateral rule of the state forum
would be likely to permit behavior which the section 1983 cause of
action was designed to deter, the post-Mondou and post-Erie cases
require that the collateral rule of the state forum give way to the
collateral rule of the generative jurisdiction. Similarly, if the collat-
eral rule of the state forum is likely to inhibit the class of persons
who are the intended beneficiaries of section 1983 from enjoying its
protection, the forum's rule should be displaced by the more hospi-
table rule of the generative jurisdiction. The application of such an
obverse-Erie analysis to section 1983 cases in state court should
result in the emergence of a uniform and hospitable body of collat-
eral rules governing the litigation of federal constitutional claims
in both state and federal courts."'
Attorney's Fees
Virtual procedural parity now exists between state and federal
courts on the question of the power to award attorney's fees in
federal constitutional cases so long as counsel is careful to plead a
section 1983 action in state court.2 2 In Thiboutot, the Court recog-
nized that Congress had determined that the intended benefi-
ciaries of section 1983 were unlikely to enjoy its full protection in
the absence of a provision permitting the award of attorney's fees
to prevailing plaintiffs. Since the power to award attorney's fees is
251. A similar evolution took place once before in the area of constitutional litigation. In
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227
U.S. 278 (1913), the Court established guidelines for the application of the fourteenth
amendment to federal judicial challenges to unconstitutional state activity. In Ward v. Love
County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920), and Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239
(1931), the Court required those guidelines to be applied in state as well as federal court.
See also General Oil Co. v. Cram, 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
252. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
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critical to the postincident ability of the intended beneficiaries of
section 1983 to enjoy its protection, the power exists, not only in
federal court, but in any state judicial forum in which the cause of
action is enforced.
Defenses and Immunities
Similarly, the important issues of executive immunity, good faith
defense, and the potential liability of government entities also ap-
pear to have been settled in favor of procedural parity. As we have
seen, the Supreme Court has established a workable theory of ex-
ecutive liability in section 1983 cases which rejects absolute immu-
nity in favor of an affirmative defense of subjective good faith and
objective reasonableness.2 53 Moreover, the Supreme Court has de-
nied government entities a derivative defense based on the good
faith of their employees, rendering the entity liable for actual dam-
ages caused by its unconstitutional policies.2 "
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the collat-
eral rules of the generative jurisdiction must be applied by the fo-
rum in defining defenses and immunities.255 Most recently, the
Court noted that a California immunity statute conferring absolute
immunity on members of parole boards would not govern a section
1983 action in the California state courts.256 Moreover, it is also
253. See notes 56-60 & accompanying text supra.
254. See note 60 & accompanying text supra.
255. See note 209 & accompanying text supra.
256. Martinez v. Califorma, 100 S. Ct. 553 (1980). See also Fern v. Ackerman, 444 U.S.
193 (1979).
Writing for a unanimous Court m Martinez, Justice Stevens noted: "It is clear that the
California immunity statute does not control this clam even being asserted in the state
courts." 100 S. Ct. at 558. As authority, Justice Stevens quoted his own Seventh Circuit
opinion: "Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3) cannot be mimumzed by state law." Id. at 558 n.8 (1980) (quoting
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917
(1974)).
Underlying the Supreme Court's recognition that uniform federal law should govern the
attributes of liability in state court is the fact that collateral rules surrounding immunity
defenses and damages are classic examples of rules wich affect, not merely the postincident
capacity to seek relief, but the premcident behavior of the targets of § 1983. Since state
collateral rules diminishing the prospect of liability would encourage precisely the behavior
wich § 1983 was designed to deter, such rules must give way to more generous federal
standards in § 1983 cases.
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clear that the precise contours of the good faith defense257 and the
allocation of the burden of proof2 55 are controlled by federal law, as
are the rules governing compensatory and punitive damages,25 19 and
the availability of equitable relief.260 Thus, the basic rules gov-
erning the nature and scope of a defendant's liability in a section
1983 case, including the operation of the fact-finding process and
the availability of remedies, should now be governed by uniform
rules in state and federal court.
Pleading
Third, while state rules will continue to govern the housekeeping
aspects of pleading, such as time limits and the amendment pro-
cess, 2 1 the basic sufficiency of a section 1983 pleading in state
court, as well as the form of action which must be pleaded, should,
under established Supreme Court precedent, be governed by uni-
form federal standards. 2
257. See note 209 & accompanying text supra.
258. See note 204 & accompanying text supra.
259. See note 208 & accompanying text supra.
260. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
The ultimate collision between differing remedial power in state and federal courts was
avoided in Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Umon, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), when the Supreme
Court overruled Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), and held that federal
courts were empowered to enjoin strikes in violation of a no-strike clause. During the period
when Sinclair Refining was good law, courts differed over whether state courts could pro-
vide a remedy which was denied to the federal courts. Compare General Elec. Co. v. Local
Union 191, 413 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1969), with McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Coun-
cil, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957). As a practical matter, since defendants were entitled
to remove to federal court, conflicts rarely arose. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge, 390 U.S. 557
(1968).
The Boys Market decision suggests that states retained power to issue an injunction even
in the absence of federal power, since the injunction would not counter, but would reinforce,
the primary behavior which the federal cause of action was designed to influence. See
also International Union v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 n.4 (1966). Boys
Market, thus, deals with a forum which affords stronger remedies than would have been
available in the generative jurisdiction. Where a forum would afford a weaker remedy, the
Boys Market analysis suggests that if failure to afford the remedy would permit conduct
forbidden by the generative jurisdiction, the full generative remedy must apply.
261. E.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Mims, 242 U.S. 532 (1917); Central Vt. Ry. v.
White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
262. E.g., Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163,




The general availability of a class action mechanism m state sec-
tion 1983 cases poses a more difficult question. Traditional cross-
forum collateral rule analysis has required the forum jurisdiction
to apply the collateral rules of the generative jurisdiction in defin-
ing the class of eligible plaintiffs.26 3 Thus, in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp.,2  the Supreme Court held that New
Jersey's collateral rule governing security for costs in shareholder
derivative suits must be applied m federal diversity litigation be-
cause it was enacted to regulate the class of eligible plaintiffs. Sim-
ilarly, in Michigan Central Railroad v. Vreeland26 5 and Carlson v.
Green,2 6 the Court applied federal survivorship rules to determine
the identity of plaintiffs eligible to enforce federal rights. However,
in Robertson v. Wegmann,267 when, unlike Carlson and Vreeland,
the plaintiff's death was unrelated to the defendants' acts, the
Court elected to borrow a state survivorship rule. In Cohen, Vree-
land, and Carlson, the generative jurisdiction's collateral rule de-
fining eligible plaintiffs was closely linked to the policy judgments
underlying the very existence of the cause of action. In Robertson,
the survivorship rule was wholly unconnected to the policies un-
derlying section 1983. The issue, therefore, in the context of sec-
tion 1983 litigation in state court is whether the collateral rules
governing the ability of a class of plaintiffs to enforce section 1983
is linked to the policies underlying section 1983, as in Cohen, Vree-
land, and Carlson, or is wholly divorced from them as in
Robertson.
As with collateral rules governing the nature and scope of liabil-
ity, the potential for class action relief should exercise substantial
deterrent effect on persons contemplating activity at the margins
263. E.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913). But see Robertson
v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
264. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
265. 227 U.S. 59 (1913).
266. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). Carlson involved a decision whether to borrow a state survivor-
ship rule to govern Bivens clams in federal court. I have suggested that the "borrowing"
cases are functionally identical to the post-Mondou and post-Ene cases. See notes 235-250
& accompanying text supra.
267. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
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of constitutional protection. Moreover, as with attorney's fees, the
availability of class action relief will significantly affect the capac-
ity of the beneficiaries of section 1983 to enjoy its protection. It is,
I suggest, precisely because the availability of class action devices
so substantially modifies the preincident and postincident activity
of persons whose behavior a cause of action is designed to affect
that Cbhen required the application of New Jersey law. Since the
availability of a class action will not merely affect, but will actually
control, much preincident behavior by placing direct restraints on
an official's freedom of action, and since members of the typical
section 1983 class are unlikely to be in a position to assert their
rights individually, the availability of class relief is no less integral
to the policies underlying section 1983 than the power to award
attorney's fees and the ability to define immunity from suit. Ac-
cordingly, its availability should similarly be governed by uni-
formly applicable federal norms.
Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations pose, perhaps, the most complex problem
in achieving a degree of procedural parity because, unlike attor-
ney's fees, burden of proof, defenses, fact-finding procedures, im-
munity doctrine, pleading, and class action rules, there is no fed-
eral rule to carry over into state court. Were Congress to enact or
had the courts forged a "federal" limitations period for section
1983 actions, the experience with cross-forum enforcement indi-
cates that the federal limitations period would certainly govern the
section 1983 action in state as well as federal court.26 8 In the ab-
sence of a federal limitations period, federal courts have obeyed
the congressional direction to supplement section 1983 procedure
by borrowing analogous state limitations periods.2 69 In determining
268. E.g., McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199 (1915).
269. See notes 238, 243 & accompanying text supra. E.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio,
446 U.S. 478 (1980); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914).
The Court held in Tomano that a state's tolling rules constituted an integral part of its
statute of limitations and, thus, governed § 1983 actions in federal court, unless they were
inconsistent with the policies underlying § 1983. The view in Tomanto of the relationship
between tolling mechanisms and statutes of limitations is consistent with the Court's posi-
tion in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 100 S. Ct. 1978 (1980), and Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U.S.
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the most appropriate analogous state limitations period, federal
courts have declined to adopt unduly short periods, recognizing
that a limitations period of reasonable length is integral to the effi-
cacy of section 1983 as a deterrent.17 0 Thus, for example, federal
courts in New York have declined to apply unduly short limita-
tions periods to many section 1983 claims, despite the arguable ap-
plicability of a four-month limitations period in a New York
court.
2 71
A similar perception, based on Justice Rehnquist's opinion m
Tomanio, should accompany section 1983 claims into state
court.272 The focus of Justice Rehnqmst's analysis is, quite prop-
erly, whether the state collateral rule is likely to run counter to the
principles of deterrence and compensation which animate section
1983. In Justice Rehnquist's-and, I think, Justice Harlan's -
terms, if a state limitations period threatens to dilute the goals of
deterrence and compensation because its short duration acts as a
de facto grant of immunity which encourages inappropriate pre-
77 (1945).
Justice Harlan doubted whether tolling mechanisms with little practical significance ex-
erted sufficient impact on the parties' primary behavior to warrant being treated as binding
by the forum jurisdiction. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). Thus, he believed that Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949), (and probably Walker) should have been decided differently. However, if you take
seriously the notion that the forum jurisdiction should defer to the allocation of risks and
benefits established by the generative jurisdiction, the limitations period, with all its neces-
sarily arbitrary concomitants, is a prune candidate for cross-forum application.
270. E.g., Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978); Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300
(2d Cir. 1977); Van Horn v. Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Va. 1975); Edgerton v. Puck-
ett, 391 F Supp. 463 (W.D. Va. 1975). But see Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1980).
See generally Comment, supra note 48. Such an approach is consistent with the Court's
summary affirmance of Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543, 546-47 (8th Cir.
1945), aff'd mem., 327 U.S. 757 (1946). See also International Union, UAW v. Hoosier Car-
dinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707 n.9 (1966); Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 615
(1895).
271. E.g., Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Meyer v. Frank, 550
F.2d 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977); Kaiser v. Cahn, 510 F.2d 282 (2d Cir.
1974) (state civil death statute cannot bar § 1983 actions by state prisoners). The Supreme
Court m Tomanto explicitly left open the applicability of the four-month limitation period.
446 U.S. at 484 n.4.
272. When a state court chooses an appropriate state limitations period for a § 1983
claim, it is applying federal law, which adopts the applicable state limitations period. See,
e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,357 U.S.
221 (1958); Pufahl v. Parks, 299 U.S. 217 (1936).
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incident behavior and thwarts reasonable postincident activity, the
limitations period is inconsistent with the full enjoyment of section
1983 rights and must give way. 7 -3
Discovery and Evidence
The two remaining areas of collateral significance, discovery and
evidence, pose difficult problems in achieving a degree of parity,
primarily because no consensus exists as to whether the collateral
rules of the forum or the generative jurisdiction should govern.
What hints we have indicate a preference for the application of
forum rules.7 4 But, as Professor Ely has noted, 75 it is probably
wrong to treat discovery and evidence as unitary packages for the
purpose of determining whether forum or generative jurisdiction
collateral rules should apply. Instead, each collateral rule must be
tested against the cause of action, to determine whether it exerts a
significant impact on the goals which the generative jurisdiction
intended to advance. For example, a state evidentiary privilege for
material assembled in preparation for litigation might well render
it impossible to enforce section 1983 claims, especially pattern or
practice claims, against governmental defendants. Such a rule
would be a prime candidate for displacement. Certainly, many as-
pects of discovery and evidence seem powerful candidates for
cross-forum applicability as do the tolling/service rules governing
the point at which litigation commences for the purpose of the
statute of limitations. 27 6
CONCLUSION
Lawyers may be inhibited from attempting to enforce federal
constitutional rights in state courts, not only by substantive con-
273. Of course, if such a limitations period is discriminatorily applied to federally-based,
but not to analogous state-based, clams, it violates the antidiscrimination rule. McKnett v.
St. Louis & S.F Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); see Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d
543, 546-47 (8th Cir. 1945), aff'd mem., 327 U.S. 757 (1946).
274. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1
(1941); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916); Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238
U.S. 507 (1915).
275. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Ere, supra note 184.
276. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 100 S. Ct. 1978 (1980); Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U.S. 77
(1945).
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cerns, but by the existence of a thicket of unfamiliar and inhospi-
table collateral rules which act as formidable obstacles to the
proper operation of a concurrent jurisdiction model for civil rights
enforcement. It should be possible, however, using traditional no-
tions of the cross-forum applicability of collateral rules, to estab-
lish a uniform and hospitable body of collateral rules governing
constitutional litigation in both state and federal court. Parity as
between state and federal courts in the critical areas of pleading,
fact-finding, remedies, defenses, immunities, fee awards, limita-
tions periods, and class actions is now merely a function of the
willingness of state judges to apply traditional post-Mondou and
post-Erie analysis to section 1983 actions in state courts.
